Desires, Reasons, and Reasons to be Moral

American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (4):287-298 (2004)
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Abstract

Opening sentences: "This paper concerns an argument which, in this author's experience, often comes up in discussions of 'Why be moral?' Although initially tempting, the argument is in error. The error warrants attention not only because it spoils the argument but because it connects to a second error which is easy to make. Both errors concern the relation between desires and (normative) practical reasons."

Author's Profile

John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

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