Motivation and practical reasons

Erkenntnis 47 (1):105-127 (1997)
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In discussions of practical reason we often encounter the view that a fact is a reason for an agent to act only if the fact is capable of moving the agent to act. This view figures centrally in many philosophical controversies, and while taken for granted by some, it is vigorously disputed by others. In this essay I show that if the disputed position is correctly interpreted, it is well armored against stock objections and implied by a premise that is not only plausible, but generally accepted by the position's critics
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