The Replication Argument for Incompatibilism

Erkenntnis:1-19 (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extend story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagen's "rollback argument" scenario. I thus call it "the replication argument." As I aim to bring out, though the argument is inspired by so-called "manipulation" and "original design" arguments, the argument is not a version of either such argument -- and plausibly has advantages over both. The result, I believe, is a more convincing incompatibilist argument than those we have considered previously.
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Archival date: 2018-04-30
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Free Will and Luck.Mele, Alfred R.

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