Free Will and Time Travel

In Meghan Griffith, Neil Levy & Kevin Timpe (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will. New York: Routledge. pp. 680-690 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this chapter I articulate the threat that time travel to the past allegedly poses to the free will of the time traveler, and I argue that on the traditional way of thinking about free will, the incompatibilist about time travel and free will wins the day. However, a residual worry about the incompatibilist view points the way toward a novel way of thinking about free will, one that I tentatively explore toward the end of the chapter.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TOGFWA-2
Revision history
First archival date: 2016-04-12
Latest version: 2 (2018-02-27)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Humean Compatibilism.Beebee, Helen & Mele, Alfred

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Free Will and Two Local Determinisms.Law, Andrew & Tognazzini, Neal A.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-05-19

Total views
242 ( #16,688 of 46,475 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #12,374 of 46,475 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.