Sophism and Moral Agnosticism, or, How to Tell a Relativist from a Pluralist

The Pluralist 6 (1):87-108 (2011)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Is it possible to recognize the limits of rationality, and thus to embrace moral pluralism, without embracing moral relativism? My answer is yes; nevertheless, certain anti-foundational positions, both recent and ancient, take a cynical stance toward the possibility of any critical moral judgment, and as such, must be regarded as relativistic.1 It is such cynicism, I argue, whether openly announced or unknowingly implied, that marks the distinction between relativism and pluralism.2 The danger of this cynicism is not so much that it renders the categorical acceptance of a particular moral view unattainable, but that it renders categorical condemnation of any particular position (or action) impossible.3 Two ..
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TORSAM-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View other versions
Added to PP
2011-03-18

Downloads
331 (#24,564)

6 months
15 (#49,322)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?