Prioritizing Platonism

Philosophical Studies (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Some see concrete foundationalism as providing the central task for sparse ontology, that of identifying which concreta ground other concreta but aren’t themselves grounded by concreta. There is, however, potentially much more to sparse ontology. The thesis of abstract foundationalism, if true, provides an additional task: identifying which abstracta ground other abstracta but aren’t themselves grounded by abstracta. We focus on two abstract foundationalist theses—abstract atomism and abstract monism—that correspond to the concrete foundationalist theses of priority atomism and priority monism. We show that a consequence of an attractive package of views is that abstract reality has a particular mereological structure, one capable of underwriting both theses. We argue that, of abstract foundationalist theses formulated in mereological terms, abstract atomism is the most plausible.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-04-27
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total downloads
110 ( #20,034 of 37,125 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
28 ( #12,665 of 37,125 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.