Results for 'monism'

370 found
Order:
  1. Priority Monism Beyond Spacetime.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (1):95-111.
    I will defend two claims. First, Schaffer's priority monism is in tension with many research programs in quantum gravity. Second, priority monism can be modified into a view more amenable to this physics. The first claim is grounded in the fact that promising approaches to quantum gravity such as loop quantum gravity or string theory deny the fundamental reality of spacetime. Since fundamental spacetime plays an important role in Schaffer's priority monism by being identified with the fundamental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  2. Priority Monism and Part/Whole Dependence.Alex Steinberg - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2025-2031.
    Priority monism is the view that the cosmos is the only independent concrete object. The paper argues that, pace its proponents, Priority monism is in conflict with the dependence of any whole on any of its parts: if the cosmos does not depend on its parts, neither does any smaller composite.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  3. Priority Monism, Partiality, and Minimal Truthmakers.A. R. J. Fisher - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491.
    Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer :307–324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  4. Priority Monism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (11):1-10.
    Argument that priority monism is best understood as being a contingent thesis.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5. Priority Monism and Essentiality of Fundamentality: A Reply to Steinberg.Matteo Benocci - unknown
    Steinberg has recently proposed an argument against Schaffer’s priority monism. The argument assumes the principle of Necessity of Monism, which states that if priority monism is true, then it is necessarily true. In this paper, I argue that Steinberg’s objection can be eluded by giving up Necessity of Monism for an alternative principle, that I call Essentiality of Fundamentality, and that such a principle is to be preferred to Necessity of Monism on other grounds as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6. Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  7. Kantian Monism.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.
    Abstract Let ?monism? be the view that there is only one basic object?the world. Monists face the question of whether there are also non-basic objects. This is in effect the question of whether the world decomposes into parts. Jonathan Schaffer maintains that it does, Terry Horgan and Matja? Potr? that it does not. In this paper, I propose a compromise view, which I call ?Kantian monism.? According to Kantian monism, the world decomposes into parts insofar as an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  8. Monism and Material Constitution.Stephen Barker & Mark Jago - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):189-204.
    Are the sculpture and the mass of gold which permanently makes it up one object or two? In this article, we argue that the monist, who answers ‘one object’, cannot accommodate the asymmetry of material constitution. To say ‘the mass of gold materially constitutes the sculpture, whereas the sculpture does not materially constitute the mass of gold’, the monist must treat ‘materially constitutes’ as an Abelardian predicate, whose denotation is sensitive to the linguistic context in which it appears. We motivate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  9. Atomism, Monism, and Causation in the Natural Philosophy of Margaret Cavendish.Karen Detlefsen - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 3:199-240.
    Between 1653 and 1655 Margaret Cavendish makes a radical transition in her theory of matter, rejecting her earlier atomism in favour of an infinitely-extended and infinitely-divisible material plenum, with matter being ubiquitously self-moving, sensing, and rational. It is unclear, however, if Cavendish can actually dispense of atomism. One of her arguments against atomism, for example, depends upon the created world being harmonious and orderly, a premise Cavendish herself repeatedly undermines by noting nature’s many disorders. I argue that her supposed difficulties (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  10. Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.
    Consequentialists often assume rational monism: the thesis that options are always made rationally permissible by the maximization of the selfsame quantity. This essay argues that consequentialists should reject rational monism and instead accept rational pluralism: the thesis that, on different occasions, options are made rationally permissible by the maximization of different quantities. The essay then develops a systematic form of rational pluralism which, unlike its rivals, is capable of handling both the Newcomb problems that challenge evidential decision theory (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. New York, NY, USA:
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12. Anomalous Monism.Julie Yoo - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This is an overview of Davidson's theory of anomalous monism. Objections and replies are also detailed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Monism and Intrinsicality.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.
    Amendment of the Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (2005) account of intrinsic properties with the aim of neutrality between competing theories of what is fundamental.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  14. Quine's Monism and Modal Eliminativism in the Realm of Supervenience.Atilla Akalın - 2019 - International Journal of Social Humanities Sciences Research (JSHRS) 6 (34):795-800.
    This study asserts that W.V.O. Quine’s eliminative philosophical gaze into mereological composition affects inevitably his interpretations of composition theories of ontology. To investigate Quine’s property monism from the account of modal eliminativism, I applied to his solution for the paradoxes of de re modalities’ . Because of its vital role to figure out how dispositions are encountered by Quine, it was significantly noted that the realm of de re modalities doesn’t include contingent and impossible inferences about things. Therefore, for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  15. Pessimism About Russellian Monism.Amy Kind - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. pp. 401-421.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  16. Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (2):186-201.
    Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti-realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual-aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Value Monism, Richness, And Environmental Ethics.Chris Kelly - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):110-129.
    The intuitions at the core of environmental ethics and of other neglected value realms put pressure on traditional anthropocentric ethics based on monistic value theories. Such pressure is so severe that it has led many to give up on the idea of monistic value theories altogether. I argue that value monism is still preferable to value pluralism and that, indeed, these new challenges are opportunities to vastly improve impoverished traditional theories. I suggest an alternative monistic theory, Richness Theory, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Can the Russellian Monist Escape the Epiphenomenalist’s Paradox?Lok-Chi Chan - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1093-1102.
    Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that physics can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not their categorical (or intrinsic) properties, whereas our qualia are constituted by those categorical properties. In this paper, I will discuss the relation between Russellian monism and a seminal paradox facing epiphenomenalism, the paradox of phenomenal judgment: if epiphenomenalism is true—qualia are causally inefficacious—then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. Truth Monism Without Teleology.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):161-163.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20. Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - 2016 - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  21. Dispositional and Categorical Properties, and Russellian Monism.Eric Hiddleston - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):65-92.
    This paper has two main aims. The first is to present a general approach for understanding “dispositional” and “categorical” properties; the second aim is to use this approach to criticize Russellian Monism. On the approach I suggest, what are usually thought of as “dispositional” and “categorical” properties are really just the extreme ends of a spectrum of options. The approach allows for a number of options between these extremes, and it is plausible, I suggest, that just about everything of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  22. Ontological Priority, Fundamentality and Monism.Matteo Morganti - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):271-288.
    In recent work, the interrelated questions of whether there is a fundamental level to reality, whether ontological dependence must have an ultimate ground, and whether the monist thesis should be endorsed that the whole universe is ontologically prior to its parts have been explored with renewed interest. Jonathan Schaffer has provided arguments in favour of 'priority monism' in a series of articles (2003, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, forthcoming). In this paper, these arguments are analysed, and it is claimed that they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  23. Monism and Gunk.Jacek Brzozowski - 2016 - In Mark Jago (ed.), Reality Making. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-74.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. Monism of Śaṅkara and Spinoza – a Comparative Study.Shakuntala Gawde - 2016 - International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 4 (3):483-489.
    This paper tries to study philosophical standpoints of Shankara and Spinoza in comparative manner. Though these two philosophers are from totally different cultures, their philosophical method has certain similarities.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Spinoza on Composition, Monism, and Beings of Reason.Róbert Mátyási - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.
    In this paper, I argue that Spinoza holds a perspectivalist view of mereological composition, a form of anti-realism. The paper has two parts: In the first half of the paper, I introduce interpretive puzzles for the standard realist reading of Spinoza’s mereology. In the second half of the paper, I discuss Spinoza’s positive view on mereological composition and present a perspectivalist reading that avoids the interpretive puzzles.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  26. Brentano's Latter-Day Monism.Uriah Kriegel - 2016 - Brentano Studien 14:69-77.
    According to “existence monism,” there is only one concrete particular, the cosmos as a whole (Horgan and Potrč 2000, 2008). According to “priority monism,” there are many concrete particulars, but all are ontologically dependent upon the cosmos as a whole, which accordingly is the only fundamental concrete particular (Schaffer 2010a, 2010b). In essence, the difference between them is that existence monism does not recognize any parts of the cosmos, whereas priority monism does – it just insists (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  28. Triple-Aspect Monism and the Ontology of Quantum Particles.Gilbert B. Côté - 2013 - Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):451.
    An analysis of the physical implications of abstractness reveals the reality of three interconnected modes of existence: abstract, virtual and concrete, corresponding in physics to information, energy and matter. This triple-aspect monism clarifies the ontological status of subatomic quantum particles. It also provides a non-spooky solution to the weirdness of quantum physics and a new outlook for the mind-body problem. The ontological implications are profound for both physics and philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Anomalous Monism: Oscillating Between Dogmas.M. De Pinedo - 2006 - Synthese 148 (1):79 - 97.
    Davidson's anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. A Dilemma for Russellian Monists About Consciousness.Adam Pautz - 2015
    I develop a new argument against Russellian Monism about consciousness.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Dual‐Aspect Monism.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  32. Pluralist-Monism. Derived Category Theory as the Grammar of N-Awareness.Shanna Dobson & Robert Prentner - manuscript
    In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Instead of positing a singular principle, telos, or essence as noumenon, we model it as plurality accessible through multiple forms of awareness (“n-awareness”). In contrast to many other approaches, our model is committed to pluralist thinking. The noumenon is plural, and reality is neither reducible nor irreducible. Nothing dies out in meaning making. We begin by mathematizing the concept of awareness by appealing to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Monism and Pluralism.Mark Eli Kalderon - manuscript
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  34. Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. Realistic Materialist Monism.Galen Strawson - 1999 - In S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & D. Chalmers (eds.), Towards a Science of Consciousness III.
    Short version of 'Real materialism', given at Tucson III Conference, 1998. (1) physicalism is true (2) the qualitative character of experience is real, as most naively understood ... so (3) the qualitative character of experience (considered specifically as such) is wholly physical. ‘How can consciousness possibly be physical, given what we know about the physical?’ To ask this question is already to have gone wrong. We have no good reason (as Priestley and Russell and others observe) to think that we (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  36. On the Common Sense Argument for Monism.Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill - 2012 - In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza On Monism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 149-166.
    The priority monist holds that the cosmos is the only fundamental object, of which every other concrete object is a dependent part. One major argument against monism goes back to Russell, who claimed that pluralism is favoured by common sense. However, Jonathan Schaffer turns this argument on its head and uses it to defend priority monism. He suggests that common sense holds that the cosmos is a whole, of which ordinary physical objects are arbitrary portions, and that arbitrary (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  37.  36
    A Monistic Conclusion to Aristotle’s Ergon Argument: The Human Good as the Best Achievement of a Human.Samuel H. Baker - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (3):373-403.
    Scholars have often thought that a monistic reading of Aristotle’s definition of the human good – in particular, one on which “best and most teleios virtue” refers to theoretical wisdom – cannot follow from the premises of the ergon argument. I explain how a monistic reading can follow from the premises, and I argue that this interpretation gives the correct rationale for Aristotle’s definition. I then explain that even though the best and most teleios virtue must be a single virtue, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Monism and Particularism: Methodology in Brentano’s Psychology.Tănăsescu Ion - 2019 - Axiomathes (4):397–412.
    The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German idealism. In Brentano’s psychological writings, this methodological requirement concretized in two different theses: (T1) The method of psychology is identical with the method of natural science; (T2) The method of psychology is inspired by the method of natural science. The thesis of this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Brentano and J. Stuart Mill on Phenomenalism and Mental Monism.Denis Fisette - 2020 - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy. Berlin, Allemagne: pp. 251-267.
    This study is about Brentano’s criticism of a version of phenomenalism that he calls “mental monism” and which he attributes to positivist philosophers such as Ernst Mach and John Stuart Mill. I am interested in Brentano’s criticism of Mill’s version of mental monism based on the idea of “permanent possibilities of sensation.” Brentano claims that this form of monism is characterized by the identification of the class of physical phenomena with that of mental phenomena, and it commits (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  40. Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists).Kelly Trogdon - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
    Response to Skiles (2009) on Trogdon (2009) on intrinsic properties and fundamentality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  41. Spinoza's Substance Monism.Michael Della Rocca - 2002 - In Olli Koistinen & J. I. Biro (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  42. Moderate Monism, Persistence and Sortal Concepts.Harold Noonan - manuscript
    Coincidence comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism is the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism is the position that even temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position is moderate monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  44
    Spinoza’s Monism II: A Proposal.Kristin Primus - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal (E1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,” I pointed out that most commentators answer this question by invoking entities that are indefinite and sempiternal, but argued that perhaps we should not be (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. The New Tweety Puzzle: Arguments Against Monistic Bayesian Approaches in Epistemology and Cognitive Science.Matthias Unterhuber & Gerhard Schurz - 2013 - Synthese 190 (8):1407-1435.
    In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45. Śrī Harṣa Contra Hegel: Monism, Skeptical Method, and the Limits of Reason.Ayon Maharaj - 2014 - Philosophy East and West 64 (1):82-108.
    This essay identifies salient points of affinity and divergence in the monistic metaphysics and skeptical methodologies of the German idealist Hegel and the Indian Advaitin Śrī Harṣa. Remarkably, both Śrī Harṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya (c. 1170) and Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) attempt to defend a monistic standpoint exclusively by means of a sustained critique of non-monistic philosophical positions. I will argue, however, that Śrī Harṣa and Hegel diverge sharply in their specific views on the powers and limits of philosophy and on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. The Ultimate Argument Against Dispositional Monist Accounts of Laws.Stephen Barker & Benjamin Smart - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):714-722.
    Bird argues that Armstrong’s necessitarian conception of physical modality and laws of nature generates a vicious regress with respect to necessitation. We show that precisely the same regress afflicts Bird’s dispositional-monist theory, and indeed, related views, such as that of Mumford & Anjum. We argue that dispositional monism is basically Armstrongian necessitarianism modified to allow for a thesis about property identity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  47. Priority Monism, Physical Intentionality and the Internal Relatedness of All Things.Hilan Bensusan & Manuel de Pinedo - manuscript
    Schaffer (2010) argues that the internal relatedness of all things, no matter how it is conceived, entails priority monism. He claims that a sufficiently pervasive internal relation among objects implies the priority of the whole, understood as a concrete object. This paper shows that at least in the case of an internal relatedness of all things conceived in terms of physical intentionality - one way to understand dispositions - priority monism not only doesn't follow but also is precluded. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Information Monism - and its Concepts of Substance, Attributes, and Emergent Modes.Dan Kurth - manuscript
    In this paper I try to combine the objectology of Meinong with a neutral substance monism of the kind originally proposed by Spinoza (deus sive natura). Yet Spinoza was still stuck in the Cartesian paradigm and therefore rather gave a dual monism (extensio et intellectus) than a proper neutral monism. I propose that there are only two attributes of the one substance: existence and non-existence. Everything else is/are mere modes of them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. The Sirens of Elea: Rationalism, Monism and Idealism in Spinoza.Yitzhak Melamed - 2012 - In Antonia Lolordo & Duncan Stewart (eds.), Debates in Early Modern Philosophy. Blackwell.
    The main thesis of Michael Della Rocca’s outstanding Spinoza book (Della Rocca 2008a) is that at the very center of Spinoza’s philosophy stands the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): the stipulation that everything must be explainable or, in other words, the rejection of any brute facts. Della Rocca rightly ascribes to Spinoza a strong version of the PSR. It is not only that the actual existence and features of all things must be explicable, but even the inexistence – as well (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. Dualism, Monism, Physicalism.Tim Crane - 2000 - Mind and Society 1 (2):73-85.
    Dualism can be contrasted with monism, and also with physicalism. It is argued here that what is essential to physicalism is not just its denial of dualism , but the epistemological and ontological authority it gives to physical science. A physicalist view of the mind must be reductive in one or both of the following senses: it must identify mental phenomena with physical phenomena or it must give an explanation of mental phenomena in physical terms . There is little (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 370