Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision

Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030 (2015)
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Abstract
According to factive accounts of the norm of belief and decision-making, you should not believe or base decisions on a falsehood. Even when the evidence misleadingly suggests that a false proposition is true, you should not believe it or base decisions on it. Critics claim that factive accounts are counterintuitive and badly mischaracterize our ordinary practice of evaluating beliefs and decisions. This paper reports four experiments that rigorously test the critic’s accusations and the viability of factive accounts. The results undermine the accusations and provide the best evidence yet of factive norms of belief and decision-making. The results also help discriminate between two leading candidates for a factive norm: truth and knowledge. Knowledge is the superior candidate
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Archival date: 2020-06-30
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew

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2015-05-13

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