Foundationalism for Modest Infinitists

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):275-283 (2010)
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Abstract
Infinitists argue that their view outshines foundationalism because infinitism can, whereas foundationalism cannot, explain two of epistemic justification’s crucial features: it comes in degrees and it can be complete. I present four different ways that foundationalists could make sense of those two features of justification, thereby undermining the case for infinitism.
ISBN(s)
0045-5091
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TURFFM
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Archival date: 2020-06-30
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