How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement

In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge (forthcoming)
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Abstract
We provide a novel defense of the possibility of level-splitting beliefs and uses this defense to show that the steadfast response to peer disagreement is not, as it is often claimed to be, unnecessarily dogmatic. To provide this defense, a neglected form of moral disagreement is analysed. Within the context of this particular kind of moral disagreement, a similarly neglected form of level-splitting belief is identified and then defended from critics of the rationality of level-splitting beliefs. The chapter concludes by showing that proponents of the steadfast response to peer disagreement can adopt this form of level-splitting belief in the context of these moral disagreements while exemplifying intellectual humility, rather than dogmatism.
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Archival date: 2019-10-03
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