Knowledge and Luck

Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 22 (2):378-390 (2015)
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Abstract
Nearly all success is due to some mix of ability and luck. But some successes we attribute to the agent’s ability, whereas others we attribute to luck. To better understand the criteria distinguishing credit from luck, we conducted a series of four studies on knowledge attributions. Knowledge is an achievement that involves reaching the truth. But many factors affecting the truth are beyond our control and reaching the truth is often partly due to luck. Which sorts of luck are compatible with knowledge? We find that knowledge attributions are highly sensitive to lucky events that change the explanation for why a belief is true. By contrast, knowledge attributions are surprisingly insensitive to lucky events that threaten but ultimately fail to change the explanation for why a belief is true. These results shed light on our concept of knowledge, help explain apparent inconsistencies in prior work on knowledge attributions, and constitute progress toward a general understanding of the relation between success and luck.
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Archival date: 2020-06-30
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References found in this work BETA
The Folk Conception of Knowledge.Starmans, Christina & Friedman, Ori
Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments.Colaço, David; Buckwalter, Wesley; Stich, Stephen & Machery, Edouard

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Citations of this work BETA
Gettier Across Cultures.Machery, Edouard; Stich, Stephen; Rose, David; Chatterjee, Amita; Karasawa, Kaori; Struchiner, Noel; Sirker, Smita; Usui, Naoki & Hashimoto, Takaaki
Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments.Colaço, David; Buckwalter, Wesley; Stich, Stephen & Machery, Edouard
Are Gettier Cases Disturbing?Hawke, Peter & Schoonen, Tom

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