On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification

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Abstract
I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TUROTR-2
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First archival date: 2020-06-30
Latest version: 2 (2020-07-02)
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2009-08-03

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