Practical and epistemic justification in alston’s "Perceiving God"

Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):290 - 299 (2008)
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Abstract
This paper clarifies and evaluates a premise of William Alston’s argument in Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said practice is reliable. I first provide the background needed to understand how this premise fits into Alston’s main argument. I then present Alston’s main argument, and proceed to clarify, criticize, modify, and ultimately reject Alston’s argument for the premise in question. Without this premise, Alston’s main argument fails.
ISBN(s)
0739-7046
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TURPAE
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Archival date: 2020-07-01
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2009-08-01

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