The distinctive “should” of assertability

Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):481-489 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Recent work has assumed that the normativity associated with assertion differs from the normativity of morality, practical rationality, etiquette, and legality. That is, whether an assertion “should” be made is not merely a function of these other familiar sorts of normativity and is especially connected to truth. Some researchers have challenged this assumption of distinctive normativity. In this paper I report two experiments that test the assumption. Participants read a brief story, judged whether an assertion should be made, and rated several other qualities of the assertion, including its truth value, morality, rationality, etiquette, legality, and folly. Of these qualities, truth value most strongly predicted assertability. The findings support the assumption of distinctive normativity and provide further evidence that the norm of our social practice of assertion is factive.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TURTDS
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-06-30
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge Norms.Benton, Matthew A.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
No Knowledge Required.Reuter, Kevin & Brössel, Peter
Knowledge and Assertion in Korean.Turri, John & Park, YeounJun

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-03-30

Total views
29 ( #47,080 of 50,248 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #46,986 of 50,248 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.