The ontology of epistemic reasons

Noûs 43 (3):490-512 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections.

Author's Profile

John Turri
University of Waterloo

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-08-01

Downloads
746 (#9,801)

6 months
53 (#17,301)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?