The truth about lying

Cognition 138:161-168 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The standard view in social science and philosophy is that lying does not require the liar’s assertion to be false, only that the liar believes it to be false. We conducted three experiments to test whether lying requires falsity. Overall, the results suggest that it does. We discuss some implications for social scientists working on social judgments, research on lie detection, and public moral discourse.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TURTTA-5
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-06-30
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect.Beebe, James R. & Buckwalter, Wesley
What Is Lying?Fallis, Don

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Lying and Knowing.Holguín, Ben
Lying Despite Telling the Truth.Wiegmann, Alex; Samland, Jana & Waldmann, Michael R.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-03-20

Total views
60 ( #40,097 of 50,248 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #48,281 of 50,248 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.