Results for 'deception'

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  1. Deception: a functional account.Marc Artiga & Cédric Paternotte - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):579-600.
    Deception has recently received a significant amount of attention. One of main reasons is that it lies at the intersection of various areas of research, such as the evolution of cooperation, animal communication, ethics or epistemology. This essay focuses on the biological approach to deception and argues that standard definitions put forward by most biologists and philosophers are inadequate. We provide a functional account of deception which solves the problems of extant accounts in virtue of two characteristics: (...)
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  2. Altruistic Deception.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 74:27-33.
    Altruistic deception (or the telling of “white lies”) is common in humans. Does it also exist in non-human animals? On some definitions of deception, altruistic deception is impossible by definition, whereas others make it too easy by counting useful-but-ambiguous information as deceptive. I argue for a definition that makes altruistic deception possible in principle without trivializing it. On my proposal, deception requires the strategic exploitation of a receiver by a sender, where “exploitation” implies that the (...)
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  3. Deception, intention and clinical practice.Nicholas Colgrove - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 1 (Online First):1-3.
    Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that ‘clinicians should not deceive their patients.’ Second, that deception is sometimes ‘in a patient’s best interest.’ Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients’ beliefs. In short, some practices only seem deceptive because of the (common) assumption that non-deceptive care is solely aimed at fostering true beliefs. Non-deceptive (...)
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  4. Self‐deception and pragmatic encroachment: A dilemma for epistemic rationality.Jie Gao - 2020 - Ratio 34 (1):20-32.
    Self-deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter-evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one’s situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self-deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about (...)
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  5. Lying, Deception, and Dishonesty: Kant and the Contemporary Debate on the Definition of Lying.Stefano Bacin - 2022 - In Luigi Caranti & Alessandro Pinzani (eds.), Kant and the Problem of Morality: Rethinking the Contemporary World. New York, NY: Routledge Chapman & Hall. pp. 73-91.
    Although Kant is one of the very few classical writers referred to in the current literature on lying, hardly any attention is paid to how his views relate to the contemporary discussion on the definition of lying. I argue that, in Kant’s account, deception is not the defining feature of lying. Furthermore, his view is able to acknowledge non-deceptive lies. Kant thus holds, I suggest, a version of what is currently labelled Intrinsic Anti-Deceptionism. In his specific version of such (...)
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  6. Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the (...)
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  7. Deceptive Retrospective Narrative Strategy and Synchronistic Prerequisite: Case Study on The Design of Impossible Puzzles.Yu Yang - 2023 - Cinej Cinema Journal 11 (1):258-288.
    The deceptive clues in the impossible puzzle film confirm the viewer’s internal expectations and allow retrospective attributing. In the film, a transcendental object negates an internal expectation, causing a retrospective blockage. Retrospectivity does not stop there; the transcendental object reinterpreting deceptive clues in the associative area leads to repeated attribution. This article consists of three parts. First, it discusses impossible puzzle films in the context of complex narrative classification. The following section introduces the Jungian concept of synchronicity and illustrates how (...)
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  8.  52
    Deception, intention and clinical practice.Nicholas Colgrove - 2023 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (7):510-512.
    Regarding the appropriateness of deception in clinical practice, two (apparently conflicting) claims are often emphasised. First, that ‘clinicians should not deceive their patients.’ Second, that deception is sometimes ‘in a patient’s best interest.’ Recently, Hardman has worked towards resolving this conflict by exploring ways in which deceptive and non-deceptive practices extend beyond consideration of patients’ beliefs. In short, some practices only seem deceptive because of the (common) assumption that non-deceptive care is solely aimed at fostering true beliefs. Non-deceptive (...)
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  9. Self-Deception as a Moral Failure.Jordan MacKenzie - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):402-21.
    In this paper, I defend the view that self-deception is a moral failure. Instead of saying that self-deception is bad because it undermines our moral character or leads to morally deleterious consequences, as has been argued by Butler, Kant, Smith, and others, I argue the distinctive badness of self-deception lies in the tragic relationship that it bears to our own values. On the one hand, self-deception is motivated by what we value. On the other hand, it (...)
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  10. Divine Deception in Descartes’ Meditations.Emanuela Scribano - 2017 - Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 38 (1):89-112.
    Descartes, Divine deception, First Meditation, Suarez.
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  11. Self-Deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.
    In this entry, I seek to show the interdependence of questions about self-deception in philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. I taxonomize solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception, present possible psychological mechanisms behind it, and highlight how different approaches to the philosophy of mind and psychology will affect how we answer important ethical questions. Is self-deception conducive to happiness? How does self-deception affect responsibility? Is there something intrinsically wrong with self-deception? The entry, on the one (...)
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  12. Deception in Sender–Receiver Games.Manolo Martínez - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):215-227.
    Godfrey-Smith advocates for linking deception in sender-receiver games to the existence of undermining signals. I present games in which deceptive signals can be arbitrarily frequent, without this undermining information transfer between sender and receiver.
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  13. Self-Deception and Delusions.Alfred Mele - 2006 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (1):109-124.
    My central question in this paper is how delusional beliefs are related to self-deception. In section 1, I summarize my position on what self-deception is and how representative instances of it are to be explained. I turn to delusions in section 2, where I focus on the Capgras delusion, delusional jealousy (or the Othello syndrome), and the reverse Othello syndrome.
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  14. Deception in Social Science Research: Is Informed Consent Possible?Alan Soble - 1978 - Hastings Center Report 8 (5):40-46.
    Deception of subjects is used frequently in the social sciences. Examples are provided. The ethics of experimental deception are discussed, in particular various maneuvers to solve the problem. The results have implications for the use of deception in the biomedical sciences.
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  15. Self-deception and shifts of attention.Kevin Lynch - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75.
    A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of (...)
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  16. Sex By Deception.Berit Brogaard - 2022 - In Manuel Vargas & John Doris (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 683-711.
    In this paper I will use sex by deception as a case study for highlighting some of the most tricky concepts around sexuality and moral psychology, including rape, consensual sex, sexual rights, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, and disrespectful sex. I begin with a discussion of morally wrong sex as rooted in the breach of five sexual liberty rights that are derived from our fundamental human liberty rights: sexual self-possession, sexual autonomy, sexual individuality, sexual dignity and sexual privacy. I then (...)
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  17. Self-deception and the selectivity problem.Marko Jurjako - 2013 - Balkan Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):151-162.
    In this article I discuss and evaluate the selectivity problem as a problem put forward by Bermudez (1997, 2000) against anti-intentionalist accounts of self-deception. I argue that the selectivity problem can be raised even against intentionalist accounts, which reveals the too demanding constraint that the problem puts on the adequacy of a psychological explanation of action. Finally I try to accommodate the intuitions that support the cogency of the selectivity problem using the resources from the framework provided by an (...)
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  18. Self-Deception and Stubborn Belief.Kevin Lynch - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (6):1337-1345.
    Stubborn belief, like self-deception, is a species of motivated irrationality. The nature of stubborn belief, however, has not been investigated by philosophers, and it is something that poses a challenge to some prominent accounts of self-deception. In this paper, I argue that the case of stubborn belief constitutes a counterexample to Alfred Mele’s proposed set of sufficient conditions for self-deception, and I attempt to distinguish between the two. The recognition of this phenomenon should force an amendment in (...)
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  19. Self-deception and confabulation.William Hirstein - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):S418-S429.
    Cases in which people are self-deceived seem to require that the person hold two contradictory beliefs, something which appears to be impossible or implausible. A phenomenon seen in some brain-damaged patients known as confabulation (roughly, an ongoing tendency to make false utterances without intent to deceive) can shed light on the problem of self-deception. The conflict is not actually between two beliefs, but between two representations, a 'conceptual' one and an 'analog' one. In addition, confabulation yields valuable clues about (...)
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  20. Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia.Christopher Bartel - 2019 - Philosophical Forum 50 (2):269-281.
    The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases (...)
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  21. Self-Deception Won't Make You Happy.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Social Theory and Practice 35 (1):107-132.
    I argue here that self-deception is not conducive to happiness. There is a long train of thought in social psychology that seems to say that it is, but proper understanding of the data does not yield this conclusion. Illusion must be distinguished from mere imagining. Self-deception must be distinguished from self-inflation bias and from self-fulfilling belief. Once these distinctions are in place, the case for self-deception falls apart. Furthermore, by yielding false beliefs, self-deception undermines desire satisfaction. (...)
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  22. Self-deception in and out of Illness: Are some subjects responsible for their delusions?Quinn Hiroshi Gibson - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 15 (3):1-12.
    This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just ‘no’. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel (...)
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  23. Self Deception and Happiness.Talya D. Osseily - manuscript
    The argument in this essay will be divided into two parts: utilitarian and virtue ethics, where each party will agree or disagree with the idea that self-deception leads to happiness, taking climate change and meat production as examples to support their claims.
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  24. Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.
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  25. Deception by topic choice: How discussion can mislead without falsehood.Ben Cross - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):696-709.
    This article explains and defends a novel idea about how people can be misled by a discussion topic, even if the discussion itself does not explicitly involve the making of false claims. The crucial aspect of this idea is that people are liable to infer, from the fact that a particular topic is being discussed, that this topic is important. As a result, they may then be led to accept certain beliefs about the state of the world they consider necessary (...)
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  26. Police Deception and Dishonesty – The Logic of Lying.Luke William Hunt - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Cooperative relations steeped in honesty and good faith are a necessity for any viable society. This is especially relevant to the police institution because the police are entrusted to promote justice and security. Despite the necessity of societal honesty and good faith, the police institution has embraced deception, dishonesty, and bad faith as tools of the trade for providing security. In fact, it seems that providing security is impossible without using deception and dishonesty during interrogations, undercover operations, pretextual (...)
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  27. Self-Deception and Illusions of Esteem: Contextualizing Du Châtelet’s Challenge.Andreas Blank - 2022 - In Ruth Edith Hagengruber (ed.), Époque Émilienne. Philosophy, Science and Culture in the Age of Émilie Du Châtelet. pp. 391-410.
    This article discusses Du Châtelet’s challenging claim that entertaining illusions, especially illusions of being esteemed by posterity, is conducive to happiness. It does so by taking a contextualizing approach, contrasting her views with some Epicurean aspects of the views on illusions and happiness in Bernard de Fontenelle and Julien Offray de La Mettrie. I will argue for three claims: (1) Du Châtelet’s comparison between self-related illusions and illusions in the theater is vulnerable to objections deriving from some distinctions that Fontenelle’s (...)
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  28. Imposter Syndrome and Self-Deception.Stephen Gadsby - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Many intelligent, capable, and successful individuals believe that their success is due to luck and fear that they will someday be exposed as imposters. A puzzling feature of this phenomenon, commonly referred to as imposter syndrome, is that these same individuals treat evidence in ways that maintain their false beliefs and debilitating fears: they ignore and misattribute evidence of their own abilities, while readily accepting evidence in favour of their inadequacy. I propose a novel account of imposter syndrome as an (...)
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  29. From self-deception to self-control.Vasco Correia - 2014 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):309-323.
    ‘Intentionalist’ approaches portray self-deceivers as “akratic believers”, subjects who deliberately choose to believe p despite knowing that p is false. In this paper I argue that the intentionalist model leads to a number of paradoxes that seem to undermine it. I claim that these paradoxes can nevertheless be overcome in light of the rival hypothesis that self-deception is a non-intentional process that stems from the influence of emotions upon cognitive processes. Furthermore, I propose a motivational interpretation of the phenomenon (...)
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  30. The product of self-deception.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (3):419 - 437.
    I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception? Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal” or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated (...)
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  31. The spandrels of self-deception: Prospects for a biological theory of a mental phenomenon.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (3):329 – 348.
    Three puzzles about self-deception make this mental phenomenon an intriguing explanatory target. The first relates to how to define it without paradox; the second is about how to make sense of self-deception in light of the interpretive view of the mental that has become widespread in philosophy; and the third concerns why it exists at all. In this paper I address the first and third puzzles. First, I define self-deception. Second, I criticize Robert Trivers' attempt to use (...)
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  32. Everybody lies: deception levels in various domains of life.Kristina Šekrst - 2022 - Biosemiotics (2).
    The goal of this paper is to establish a hierarchical level of deception which does not apply only to humans and non-human animals, but also to the rest of the living world, including plants. We will follow the hierarchical categorization of deception, set forth by Mitchell (1986), in which the first level of deception starts with mimicry, while the last level of deception includes learning and intentionality, usually attributed to primates. We will show how such a (...)
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  33. Willful ignorance and self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):505-523.
    Willful ignorance is an important concept in criminal law and jurisprudence, though it has not received much discussion in philosophy. When it is mentioned, however, it is regularly assumed to be a kind of self-deception. In this article I will argue that self-deception and willful ignorance are distinct psychological kinds. First, some examples of willful ignorance are presented and discussed, and an analysis of the phenomenon is developed. Then it is shown that current theories of self-deception give (...)
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  34. Deception and Consent.Tom Dougherty - 2018 - In Peter Schaber & Andreas Müller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Routledge.
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  35. Brain Fiction: Self-Deception and the Riddle of Confabulation.William Hirstein - 2005 - MIT Press.
    [This download contains the Table of Contents and Chapter 1.] This first book-length study of confabulation breaks ground in both philosophy and cognitive science.
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  36. Is Self-Deception Pretense?José Eduardo Porcher - 2014 - Manuscrito 37 (2):291-332.
    I assess Tamar Gendler's (2007) account of self-deception according to which its characteristic state is not belief, but imaginative pretense. After giving an overview of the literature and presenting the conceptual puzzles engendered by the notion of self-deception, I introduce Gendler's account, which emerges as a rival to practically all extant accounts of self-deception. I object to it by first arguing that her argument for abandoning belief as the characteristic state of self-deception conflates the state of (...)
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  37. When is deception in research ethical?Nafsika Athanassoulis & James Wilson - 2009 - Clinical Ethics 4 (1):44-49.
    This article examines when deceptive withholding of information is ethically acceptable in research. The first half analyses the concept of deception. We argue that there are two types of accounts of deception: normative and non-normative, and argue that non-normative accounts are preferable. The second half of the article argues that the relevant ethical question which ethics committees should focus on is not whether the person from whom the information is withheld will be deceived, but rather on the reasonableness (...)
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  38. Misinformation and Intentional Deception: A Novel Account of Fake News.Michel Croce & Tommaso Piazza - 2021 - In Maria Silvia Vaccarezza & Nancy Snow (eds.), Virtues, Democracy, and Online Media: Ethical and Epistemic Issues. Routledge.
    This chapter introduces a novel account of fake news and explains how it differs from other definitions on the market. The account locates the fakeness of an alleged news report in two main aspects related to its production, namely that its creators do not think to have sufficient evidence in favor of what they divulge and they fail to display the appropriate attitude towards the truth of the information they share. A key feature of our analysis is that it does (...)
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  39. Depth psychology and self-deception.Robert Lockie - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):127-148.
    This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depth-psychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches. The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious. Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception. It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes. Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, (...)
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  40. The Relationship of Self-Deception and Other-Deception.Anna Wehofsits - 2023 - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Unlike the question of whether self-deception can be understood on the model of other-deception, the relationship between the two phenomena at the level of practice is hardly ever explored. Other-deception can support self-deception and vice versa. Self-deception often affects not only the beliefs and behavior of the self-deceiving person but also the beliefs and behavior of others who may become accomplices of self-deception. As I will show, however, it is difficult to describe this supportive (...)
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  41. Robot Betrayal: a guide to the ethics of robotic deception.John Danaher - 2020 - Ethics and Information Technology 22 (2):117-128.
    If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; superficial state deception; and (...)
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  42. Self-deception, religious belief, and the false belief condition.Kevin Lynch - 2010 - Heythrop Journal 51 (6):1073-1074.
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  43. consent and deception.Robert Jubb - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (2):223-229.
    Tom Dougherty has recently defended the claim that all deception that is consequential for sex is seriously wrong. This discussion piece argues that deception does not have to seriously undermine consent and that when sexual deception is seriously wrong, that may not only be to do with its relation to consent. In doing so, it defends distinguishing between the seriousness of deceptions, whether these are sexual or in other areas of life, and so defends what Dougherty calls (...)
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  44. Non-belief as self-deception?Lari Launonen - 2024 - Religious Studies.
    The suppression thesis is the theological claim that theistic non-belief results from culpable mistreatment of one’s knowledge of God or one’s evidence for God. The thesis is a traditional one but unpopular today. This article examines whether it can gain new credibility from the philosophy of self-deception and from the cognitive science of religion. The thesis is analysed in terms of the intentionalist and the non-intentionalist model of self-deception. The first proposed model views non-belief as intentional suppression of (...)
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  45. Politics, Deception, and Being Self-Deceived. [REVIEW]M. R. X. Dentith - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (4):38-43.
    A review of Anna Elisabeth Galeotti's "Political Self-Deception".
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  46. Keeping Self-Deception in Perspective.Lawrence Lengbeyer - 1998 - In Jean-Pierre Dupuy (ed.), Self-Deception and Paradoxes of Rationality. CSLI Publications.
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    Taking Care: Self-Deception, Culpability and Control.Ian Deweese-Boyd - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):161-176.
    Whether self-deceivers can be held morally responsible for their self-deception is largely a question of whether they have the requisite control over the acquisition and maintenance of their self-deceptive beliefs. In response to challenges to the notion that self-deception is intentional or requires contradictory beliefs, models treating self-deception as a species of motivated belief have gained ascendancy. On such so-called deflationary accounts, anxiety, fear, or desire triggers psychological processes that produce bias in favor of the target belief (...)
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  48. Deception and the Nature of Truth.Michael Lynch - 2009 - In Clancy W. Martin (ed.), The Philosophy of Deception. Oxford University Press. pp. 188.
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  49. Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-Deception.Ali Hossein Khani - 2023 - Res Philosophica 100 (2):203-226.
    Wright’s judgement-dependent account of intention is an attempt to show that truths about a subject’s intentions can be viewed as constituted by the subject’s own best judgements about those intentions. The judgements are considered to be best if they are formed under certain cognitively optimal conditions, which mainly include the subject’s conceptual competence, attentiveness to the questions about what the intentions are, and lack of any material self-deception. Offering a substantive, non-trivial specification of the no-self-deception condition is one (...)
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  50. Spiritual blindness, self-deception and morally culpable nonbelief.Kevin Kinghorn - 2007 - Heythrop Journal 48 (4):527–545.
    While we may not be able simply to choose what we believe, there is still scope for culpability for what we come to belief. I explore here the distinction between culpable and non-culpable theistic unbelief, investigating the process of self-deception to which we can voluntarily contribute in cases where we do become culpable for failing to believe something.
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