Splitting the Horns of Euthyphro's Modal Relative

Faith and Philosophy 30 (2):205-212 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There is a modal relative of Euthyphro’s dilemma that goes like this: are necessary truths true because God affirms them, or does God affirm them because they’re true? If you accept the first horn, necessary truths are as contingent as God’s free will. If you accept the second, God is less ultimate than the modal ontology that establishes certain truths as necessary. If you try to split the horns by affirming that necessary truths are somehow grounded in God’s nature, Brian Leftow meets you with an argument. I will argue that Leftow’s argument fails and that, contrary to his argument, there is a good reason to believe that necessary truths are grounded in God’s nature.
ISBN(s)
0739-7046
PhilPapers/Archive ID
TWESTH
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-10-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2013-09-04

Total views
88 ( #49,395 of 65,737 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #64,778 of 65,737 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.