The phenomenological argument for the disjunctive theory of perception

European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):53-66 (2009)
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According to the phenomenological argument for disjunctivism, the reasons why we should prefer the disjunctive theory over its rivals is that (1) the disjunctive theory conforms the most to our pretheoretical or natural convictions about perception (what Michael Martin calls naïve realism), and (2) we should commit ourselves to naïve realism because it conforms the most to the phenomenology of the perceptual experience of objects. In this paper, I try to explain why is the phenomenal argument exceptionally strong argument for disjunctivism and at the same time against sense-datum and intentional theories. Furthermore, I try to show that the disjunctivist’s explanation of hallucination (which is allegedly the weak point of the theory) is as plausible as its rivals’.

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János Tőzsér
Research Centre for The Humanities, Budapest, Hungary


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