The Inaccuracy of Partial Truth in Yablovian If-Thenism

Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):206-211 (2017)
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Abstract

Yablo has argued for an alternative form of if-thenism that is more conducive with his figurative fictionalism. This commentary sets out to challenge whether the remainder, ρ, tends to be an inaccurate representation of the conditions that are supposed to complete the enthymeme from φ to Ψ. Whilst by some accounts the inaccuracies shouldn't set off any alarm bells, the truth of ρ is too inexact. The content of ρ, a partial truth, must display a sensitivity to the contextual background conditions for subtraction to work properly in Yablo's view. Using a toy example, I argue that Yablo's subtraction model tends to yield partial truths as remainders that fail to rule out inaccurate expressions that may prove to be problematic for it.

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Joseph Ulatowski
University of Waikato

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