The Inaccuracy of Partial Truth in Yablovian If-Thenism

Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):206-211 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Yablo has argued for an alternative form of if-thenism that is more conducive with his figurative fictionalism. This commentary sets out to challenge whether the remainder, ρ, tends to be an inaccurate representation of the conditions that are supposed to complete the enthymeme from φ to Ψ. Whilst by some accounts the inaccuracies shouldn't set off any alarm bells, the truth of ρ is too inexact. The content of ρ, a partial truth, must display a sensitivity to the contextual background conditions for subtraction to work properly in Yablo's view. Using a toy example, I argue that Yablo's subtraction model tends to yield partial truths as remainders that fail to rule out inaccurate expressions that may prove to be problematic for it.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-03-06
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Aboutness.Yablo, Stephen
Index.Yablo, Stephen
Mimesis as Make-Believe.Walton, Kendall L.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
103 ( #32,649 of 50,005 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
30 ( #21,287 of 50,005 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.