Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content

Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. I do not experience the table by experiencing some- thing else over and above the table and its facing surface. I see the facing surface of the table directly.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
UNKIAT
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Almog, Joseph; Perry, John & Wettstein, Howard (eds.)
Intentionality.Searle, John
The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Perceiving Tropes.Nanay, Bence

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
733 ( #2,356 of 37,125 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
37 ( #9,614 of 37,125 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.