Time-biases and Rationality: The Philosophical Perspectives on Empirical Research about Time Preferences

In Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brożek & Łukasz Kurek (eds.), The Emergence of Normative Orders. Copernicus Press. pp. 149-187 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The empirically documented fact is that people’s preferences are time -biased. The main aim of this paper is to analyse in which sense do time -biases violate the requirements of rationality, as many authors assume. I will demonstrate that contrary to many influential views in psychology, economy and philosophy it is very difficult to find why the bias toward the near violates the requirements rationality. I will also show why the bias toward the future violates the requirements of rationality in a very basic sense.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
URATAR
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-11-02

Total views
770 ( #3,184 of 43,080 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
114 ( #4,010 of 43,080 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.