Giere's (In)Appropriation of Distributed Cognition

Social Epistemology 25 (4):379 - 391 (2011)
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Ronald Giere embraces the perspective of distributed cognition to think about cognition in the sciences. I argue that his conception of distributed cognition is flawed in that it bears all the marks of its predecessor; namely, individual cognition. I show what a proper (i.e. non-individual) distributed framework looks like, and highlight what it can and cannot do for the philosophy of science

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Krist Vaesen
Eindhoven University of Technology


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