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Hedging and the Norm of Belief
Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
Abstract
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion.Author Profiles
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Added to PP
2023-04-19
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617 (#37,265)
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125 (#36,468)
2023-04-19
Downloads
617 (#37,265)
6 months
125 (#36,468)
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