Of Miracles and Evidential Probability: Hume’s “Abject Failure” Vindicated

Hume Studies 31 (1):37-61 (2005)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper defends David Hume's "Of Miracles" from John Earman's (2000) Bayesian attack by showing that Earman misrepresents Hume's argument against believing in miracles and misunderstands Hume's epistemology of probable belief. It argues, moreover, that Hume's account of evidence is fundamentally non-mathematical and thus cannot be properly represented in a Bayesian framework. Hume's account of probability is show to be consistent with a long and laudable tradition of evidential reasoning going back to ancient Roman law.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2018-06-11
Latest version: 1 (2018-11-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
716 ( #6,232 of 56,919 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
109 ( #5,409 of 56,919 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.