The rationale of rationalization

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e53 (2019)
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Abstract

While we agree in broad strokes with the characterisation of rationalization as a “useful fiction,” we think that Fiery Cushman's claim remains ambiguous in two crucial respects: the reality of beliefs and desires, that is, the fictional status of folk-psychological entities and the degree to which they should be understood as useful. Our aim is to clarify both points and explicate the rationale of rationalization.

Author Profiles

Walter Veit
University of Reading
Max Jones
University of Bristol
Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
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