Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics

Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):121-144 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Hard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they mustaccept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”- based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to do things we do not do can instead appeal to Humean moral reasons that are based on desires to be virtuous. Moral reasons grounded on desires to be virtuous do not depend on our being able to act on those reasons in the way that “ought”-based moral reasons do
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-06-18
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
426 ( #15,476 of 64,083 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #45,779 of 64,083 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.