An Interpretation of McCall’s “Real Possible Worlds” and His Semantics for Counterfactuals

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Abstract
McCall (1984) offered a semantics of counterfactual conditionals based on “real possible worlds” that avoids using the vague notion of similarity between possible worlds. I will propose an interpretation of McCall’s counterfactuals in a formal framework based on Baltag-Moss-Solecki events and protocols. Moreover, I will argue that using this interpretation one can avoid an objection raised by Otte (1987).
ISBN(s)
1584-174X
PhilPapers/Archive ID
VIRHTC
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First archival date: 2017-01-04
Latest version: 2 (2017-01-05)
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2016-11-06

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