In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
AbstractPhilosophers pursue a number of different explanatory projects when explaining various sorts of normative phenomena. This chapter takes some steps towards understanding this variety. I lay some general ground about explanation. I describe some key axes of debate about explanations that first-order normative inquiry typically seeks to state and defend. And I briefly discuss how two other sorts of normative explanation that seem more concerned with the foundations of normative domains like ethics and practical reason might be understood and how they relate to first-order normative explanations.
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