Analysis 82 (1):3-7 (2022)
AbstractIn a recent paper, Gow raised a new and interesting problem for externalist representationalism, the conclusion of which is that its proponents are unable to provide an acceptable account of the phenomenal character of colour hallucination. In contrast to Gow, we do not believe that the problem is particularly severe – indeed, that there is any problem at all. Thus our aim is to defend externalist representationalism against the problem raised by Gow. To this end, we will first reconstruct her reasoning, and then show that it poses no real challenge to externalist representationalism.
Archival historyArchival date: 2021-10-14
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