Fundamentality And Modal Freedom

Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):397-418 (2016)
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Abstract
A fundamental entity is an entity that is ‘ontologically independent’; it does not depend on anything else for its existence or essence. It seems to follow that a fundamental entity is ‘modally free’ in some sense. This assumption, that fundamentality entails modal freedom (or ‘FEMF’ as I shall label the thesis), is used in the service of other arguments in metaphysics. But as I will argue, the road from fundamentality to modal freedom is not so straightforward. The defender of FEMF should provide positive reasons for believing it, especially in light of recent views that are incompatible with it. I examine both direct and indirect routes to FEMF.
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First archival date: 2016-07-26
Latest version: 3 (2016-10-07)
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Truth and Truthmakers.Armstrong, D. M.

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Prioritizing Platonism.Trogdon, Kelly & Cowling, Sam
On Shaky Ground?Wildman, Nathan

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