Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori

Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426 (2009)
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Abstract
This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori ; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the naturalist’s commitment to scientific methodology in that it allows for apriori-justified claims to be sensitive to further conceptual developments and the expansion of evidence. The fallibilist apriorist allows that an a priori claim is revisable in only a purely epistemic sense. This modal claim is weaker than what is required for a revisability thesis to establish empiricism, so fallibilist apriorism represents a distinct position.
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References found in this work BETA
Word and Object.Quine, W. V.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pragmatism, Kant, and Transcendental Philosophy.Gava, Gabriele & Stern, Robert (eds.)

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2009-01-28

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