Reasons and Guidance

Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235 (2016)
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Abstract
Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normative reasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought that reasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative counter-examples due to Julia Markovits, Mark Schroeder, and others. This paper develops and motivates an interpretation of the response constraint that avoids the putative counter-examples.
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WAYRAG-2
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Archival date: 2016-06-08
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References found in this work BETA
Why Be Rational?Kolodny, Niko
The Wrong Kind of Reason.Hieronymi, Pamela
I Ought, Therefore I Can.Vranas, Peter B. M.

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