Value and reasons to favour

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Abstract
This paper defends a 'fitting attitudes' view of value on which what it is for something to be good is for there to be reasons to favour that thing. The first section of the paper defends a 'linking principle' connecting reasons and value. The second and third sections argue that this principle is better explained by a fitting-attitudes view than by 'value-first' views on which reasons are explained in terms of value.
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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References found in this work BETA
The Domain of Reasons.Skorupski, John

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Citations of this work BETA
Fitting Belief.McHugh, Conor

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2011-11-22

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