Attitudes and relativism

Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):527-544 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Data about attitude reports provide some of the most interesting arguments for, and against, various theses of semantic relativism. This paper is a short survey of three such arguments. First, I’ll argue (against recent work by von Fintel and Gillies) that relativists can explain the behaviour of relativistic terms in factive attitude reports. Second, I’ll argue (against Glanzberg) that looking at attitude reports suggests that relativists have a more plausible story to tell than contextualists about the division of labour between semantics and meta-semantics. Finally, I’ll offer a new argument for invariantism (i.e. against both relativism and contextualism) about moral terms. The argument will turn on the observation that the behaviour of normative terms in factive and non-factive attitude reports is quite unlike the behaviour of any other plausibly context-sensitive term. Before that, I’ll start with some taxonomy, just so as it’s clear what the intended conclusions below are supposed to be.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WEAAAR
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-05-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Metaethical Contextualism Defended.Björnsson, Gunnar & Finlay, Stephen

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
169 ( #24,431 of 50,159 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #32,864 of 50,159 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.