Games, Beliefs and Credences

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In previous work I’ve defended an interest-relative theory of belief. This paper continues the defence. It has four aims. 1. To offer a new kind of reason for being unsatis ed with the simple Lockean reduction of belief to credence. 2. To defend the legitimacy of appealing to credences in a theory of belief. 3. To illustrate the importance of theoretical, as well as practical, interests in an interest-relative account of belief. 4. To revise my account to cover propositions that are practically and theoretically irrelevant to the agent.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-05-21
View other versions
Added to PP

424 (#19,105)

6 months
19 (#42,678)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?