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Scepticism, Rationalism, and Externalism
In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 311-331 (2005)
Abstract
I argue that we have to accept one of the three isms in the title. Either inductive scepticism is true, or we have substantial contingent a priori knowledge, or a strongly externalist theory of knowledge is correct.Author's Profile
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2019-05-25
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68 (#78,205)
2019-05-25
Downloads
68 (#98,786)
6 months
68 (#78,205)
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