Baker's First-person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem

Phenomenology and Mind 7:158-168 (2015)
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Abstract
Lynne Baker's concept of a first-person perspective is not as clear and straightforward as it might seem at first glance. There is a discrepancy between her argumentation that we have first-person perspectives and some characteristics she takes first-person perspectives to have, namely, that the instances of this capacity necessarily persist through time and are indivisible and unduplicable. Moreover, these characteristics cause serious problems concerning personal identity.
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Archival date: 2018-09-21
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Survival and Identity.Lewis, David K.
‘The Self’.Strawson, Galen

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