Baker's First-person Perspectives: They Are Not What They Seem

Phenomenology and Mind 7:158-168 (2015)
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Abstract

Lynne Baker's concept of a first-person perspective is not as clear and straightforward as it might seem at first glance. There is a discrepancy between her argumentation that we have first-person perspectives and some characteristics she takes first-person perspectives to have, namely, that the instances of this capacity necessarily persist through time and are indivisible and unduplicable. Moreover, these characteristics cause serious problems concerning personal identity.

Author's Profile

Marc Andree Weber
Universit├Ąt Mannheim

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