Experimental Philosophy, Noisy Intuitions, and Messy Inferences

In Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy & Philosophical Methodology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic (2016)
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Much discussion about experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology has been framed in terms of the reliability of intuitions, and even when it has not been about reliability per se, it has been focused on whether intuitions meet whatever conditions they need to meet to be trustworthy as evidence. But really that question cannot be answered independently from the questions, evidence for what theories arrived at by what sorts of inferences? I will contend here that not just philosophy's sources of evidence, but also its inferential resources, are in great need of closer examination.

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Jonathan Weinberg
University of Arizona


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