Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):422–444 (2005)
AbstractIt has been claimed that justiﬁcation, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justiﬁcation that is completely dependent on the subject’s experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the believer. The traditional intermalist notion of justiﬁcation completely satisﬁes the second desideratum and largely satisﬁes the ﬁrst.
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