Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):249-254 (2000)
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Abstract
In a recent article, David Hunt has proposed a theological counterexample to the principle of alternative possibilities involving divine foreknowledge. Hunt claims that this example is immune to my criticism of regular Frankfurt-type counterexamples to that principle, as God’s foreknowing an agent’s act does not causally determine that act. Furthermore, he claims that the considerations which support the claim that the agent is morally responsible for his act in a Frankfurt-type scenario also hold in a G-scenario. In reply, Icontest Hunt’s symmetry claim and also raise a worry whether, given theological fatalism, the agent’s act in a G-scenario can be deemed a free act in the libertarian sense. Finally, I offer an independent argument why in a G-scenario the agent should not regarded morally blameworthy for his act.
ISBN(s)
0739-7046
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WIDTFA-2
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Archival date: 2016-05-25
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