Abstract

This paper examines to what extent Jaeggi’s concept of alienation can account for instances of alienation that have a social cause and require a social solution. The paper argues that there are three interrelated problems with her account of alienation. First, Jaeggi’s conception of alienation is unable to make a distinction between individual and social causes of alienation. Second, Jaeggi constructs alienation as an individual failure to appropriate norms and roles properly, but in doing so, conflates two requirements for appropriation, namely, objective appropriability, and successful appropriation. Third, the failure to make this distinction causes Jaeggi to be unable to understand alienation truly as a social pathology because she is unable to distinguish incidental sources for alienation from structural, social sources for alienation. Only the second kind of alienation can count as a social pathology. A solution is proposed to overcome those problems, namely to understand instances of structural alienation as blockages of social freedom. Structural alienation occurs if social structures make self-determination impossible, so that alienation is the result of a structural flaw. Understanding alienation in this way enables us to think of alienation as a social problem that requires a social solution. This is an important insight because, given the centrality of the concept of alienation, it suggests a way in which the concept of alienation can be used in the tradition of critical theory to criticize social conditions.