Against Ideal Guidance, Again: A Reply to Erman and Möller

Journal of Politics (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Eva Erman and Niklas Möller have recently presented a trenchant critique of my (2015) argument that ideal normative theories are uninformative for certain practical purposes. Their criticisms are largely correct. In this note, I develop the ideas behind my earlier argument in a way that circumvents their critique and explains more clearly why ideal theory is uninformative for certain purposes while leaving open the possibility that it might be informative for other purposes.

Author's Profile

David Wiens
University of California, San Diego

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