Against the Doctrine of Infallibility

Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.

Author's Profile

Christopher Willard-Kyle
University of Glasgow

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-02-04

Downloads
606 (#22,438)

6 months
269 (#6,330)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?