Results for 'Veritism'

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  1. Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
    According to Veritism, true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Epistemologists often take Veritism to entail that all other epistemic items can only have value by standing in certain instrumental relations—namely, by tending to produce a high ratio of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many value theorists outside epistemology deny that all derivative value is grounded in instrumental relations to fundamental value. Veritists, I believe, can and should follow (...)
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  2. Veritism, Epistemic Risk, and the Swamping Problem.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):761-774.
    Veritism says that the fundamental source of epistemic value for a doxastic state is the extent to which it represents the world correctly: that is, its fundamental epistemic value is deter...
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  3. Veritism Refuted? Understanding, Idealization, and the Facts.Tamer Nawar - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4295-4313.
    Elgin offers an influential and far-reaching challenge to veritism. She takes scientific understanding to be non-factive and maintains that there are epistemically useful falsehoods that figure ineliminably in scientific understanding and whose falsehood is no epistemic defect. Veritism, she argues, cannot account for these facts. This paper argues that while Elgin rightly draws attention to several features of epistemic practices frequently neglected by veritists, veritists have numerous plausible ways of responding to her arguments. In particular, it is not (...)
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  4. Vérité partielle et réalisme scientifique: une approche bungéenne.Jean-Pierre Marquis - 2020 - Mεtascience 1:293-314.
    Le réalisme scientifique occupe une place centrale dans le système philosophique de Mario Bunge. Au cœur de cette thèse, on trouve l’affirmation selon laquelle nous pouvons connaître le monde partiellement. Il s’ensuit que les théories scientifiques ne sont pas totalement vraies ou totalement fausses, mais plutôt partiellement vraies et partiellement fausses. Ces énoncés sur la connaissance scientifique, à première vue plausible pour quiconque est familier avec la pratique scientifique, demandent néanmoins à être clarifiés, précisés et, ultimement, à être inclus dans (...)
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  5. Veritism and the Normativity of Logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2021 - Ratio 34 (1):7-19.
    The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide-scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw (...)
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  6. La vérité et le champ visuel.Barry Smith - 2002 - In Jean-Michel Roy, Jean Francisco J. Varela & Bernard Pachoud (eds.), Naturaliser la phénoménologie: Husserlianisme et science cognitive. Paris: CNRS Editions. pp. 411-426.
    La présente étude utilise les outils du domaine de la méréotopologie (la théorie des parts, ensembles et frontières) pour élaborer les implications de certaines analogies entre la 'psychologie écologique' de J.J.Gibson et la phénoménologie de Edmund Husserl. On présentera une théorie ontologique de frontières spatiales et des entités possédant une extension spatiale. S'en rapportant aux exemples de la sphère de géographie, on démontre qu'aussi bien les frontières que les entités à extension spatiale appartiennent à deux vastes catégories: des objets qui (...)
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  7. Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-25.
    We argue that there is a tension between two monistic claims that are the core of recent work in epistemic consequentialism. The first is a form of monism about epistemic value, commonly known as veritism: accuracy is the sole final objective to be promoted in the epistemic domain. The other is a form of monism about a class of epistemic scoring rules: that is, strictly proper scoring rules are the only legitimate measures of inaccuracy. These two monisms, we argue, (...)
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  8.  73
    Vérité de foi et vie des communautés chrétiennes selon Irénée de Lyon.Jacques Fantino - 1996 - Revue des Sciences Religieuses 70 (2):240-253.
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  9. Caritas in Veritate: Economic Activity as Personal Encounter and the Economy of Gratuitousness.James Franklin - 2011 - Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics 1 (1):Article 3.
    We first survey the Catholic social justice tradition, the foundation on which Caritas in Veritate builds. Then we discuss Benedict’s addition of love to the philosophical virtues (as applied to economics), and how radical a change that makes to an ethical perspective on economics. We emphasise the reality of the interpersonal aspects of present-day economic exchanges, using insights from two disciplines that have recognized that reality, human resources and marketing. Personal encounter really is a major factor in economic exchanges in (...)
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  10. Is Truth the Gold Standard of Inquiry? A Comment on Elgin’s Argument Against Veritism.Moti Mizrahi - 2021 - Foundations of Science 26 (2):275-280.
    In True enough,, Elgin argues against veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elgin’s argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elgin’s argument fails as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. Just as one can aim at gold medals and still (...)
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  11.  46
    Connaissance Et Vérité Chez Maître Eckhart: Seul le Juste Connaît la Justice. [REVIEW]Tobias Hoffmann - 2007 - Review of Metaphysics 61 (2):407-409.
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  12.  76
    Local Communities and Globalization in Caritas in Veritate.Jeffery Nicholas - 2011 - Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics 1 (1):Article 5.
    Caritas in Veritate leaves us with a question, Does Benedict XVI see politics as a practice or as an institution? How one answers this question has tremendous implications for how one should address the inequalities of contemporary society and the increasing globalization of the world. Alasdair MacIntyre, for instance, would consider politics to be primarily a practice with a good internal to its activities. This good consists in rational deliberation with others about the common good. If one considers politics an (...)
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  13. L’infinité et l’idéalité du fini : une lecture sur la théorie de la véritable infinité dans la Science de la logique.Arif Yildiz - 2020 - In D. Ferrer F. Orsini M. Bordignon A. Bavaresco C. Iber (ed.), A Autobiografia do Pensamento. A Ciência da Lógica de Hegel. Brasília - Brasilia, Federal District, Brazil: pp. 143-166.
    Le passage spéculatif de la catégorie du mauvais infini dans le véritable infini reste l’un des plus importants dans la Science de la logique. Comme il est bien connu, ce passage est expliqué par Hegel à travers sa théorie de l’idéalité du fini. Pourtant, du fait de sa structure complexe, le surgissement du véritable infini au sein du fini par l’idéalisation peut être considéré comme un processus abstrait, consistant seulement à supprimer la dualité de l’infinité. Cet article se propose donc (...)
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  14. La critique du critère de vérité épicurien chez Sextus Empiricus: un scepticisme sur le monde extérieur?Diego E. Machuca - 2013 - In S. Marchand & F. Verde (eds.), Épicurisme et scepticisme. Sapienza Università Editrice. pp. 105-127.
    It is generally agreed that one of the key differences between ancient skepticism and modern and contemporary skepticism is that the ancient skeptic does not call into question the existence of the external world, but only our ability to know the properties or qualities of external objects. In this paper, I argue that in Sextus Empiricus's attack on the Epicurean criterion of truth one finds evidence that the ancient Pyrrhonist also suspends judgment about the existence of external objects.
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  15.  86
    L’objectivité scientifique à l’heure de la post-vérité.Laurent Jodoin - 2020 - Mεtascience 1:199-219.
    L’objectivité permettrait d’assurer la supériorité de la science par rapport à d’autres modes de connaissance. Elle doit donc être défendue, surtout en cette « ère de post-vérité » où les « faits alternatifs » remplacent les faits avérés, en politique comme ailleurs. Or les attaques proviennent autant de l’extérieur que de l’intérieur de la sphère philosophique. Il convient donc de tenter d’opérer la réconciliation la plus large possible avec deux représentants de clans (très) opposés, Mario Bunge et Bruno Latour. Réinvestissant (...)
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  16.  32
    Le démocrate doit-il renoncer à la vérité? Sur le procéduralisme épistémique de David Estlund.Charles Girard - 2018 - Diogène 261 (1-2):34.
    Abstact : This article provides a critical examination of David Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism. Epistemic proceduralism suggests a promising way to justify democracy without renouncing the pursuit of truth. By making the legitimacy and authority of democratic institutions dependent on their general tendency to produce good decisions, rather than on the correctness of their results or on their mere procedural fairness, it shows that they can to be connected to substantial standards, such as justice, without ignoring the persistence of moral disagreements. (...)
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  17. Une théorie unifiée de la vérité et de la référence.Barry Smith & Berit Brogaard - 2004 - In J. M. Monnoyer (ed.), La Structure du Monde: Objets, Propriétés, États du Choses. Paris: Vrin. pp. 141-184.
    The truthmaker theory rests on the thesis that the link between a true judgment and that in the world to which it corresponds is not a one-to-one but rather a one-to-many relation. An analogous thesis in relation to the link between a singular term and that in the world to which it refers is already widely accepted. This is the thesis to the effect that singular reference is marked by vagueness of a sort that is best understood in supervaluationist terms. (...)
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  18.  64
    Bringing an End to the Interpretative Dispute on Descartes’s Cogito: The Cogito as Vérité, Cognitio, Propositio, and Conclusio.Ayumu Tamura - 2020 - Philosophy Journal 13 (3):38-48.
    The aim of this paper is to bring an end to the interpretative dispute on Descartes’s cog­ito: is the cogito known by intuition or by inference? There have been several studies based on both analytical and historical approaches to the dispute, and it seems that we have exhausted all interpretations. Nevertheless, I wish to revisit this dispute, as it ap­pears that the previous studies have overlooked Descartes’s use of words and phrases, which is the most significant for understanding his various (...)
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  19.  60
    Boèce de Dacie Et la Double Vérité.E. Gilson - 1955 - Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 22.
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  20. « Fundamentals of Ecology » de E.P. Odum : Véritable « Approche Holistique » Ou Réductionnisme Masqué ?Donato Bergandi - 1993 - Bulletin d'Écologie, 24 24 (1):57-68.
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  21.  94
    La traduzione italiana delle Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate di Tommaso d'Aquino.Maurizio Mangiagalli - 2007 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 99 (3):517.
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  22. Est-il rationnel de chercher la vérité?Howard Sankey - 2000 - Revue Philosophique De Louvain 98 (3):589-602.
    This paper addresses the question of whether it is rational for scientists to pursue the realist aim of truth. The point of departure is a pair of objections to the aim of truth due to the anti-realist author, Larry Laudan: first, it is not rational to pursue an aim such as truth which we cannot know we have reached; second, truth is not a legitimate aim for science because it cannot be shown to be attained. Against Laudan, it is argued (...)
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  23. Business Ethics: Diagnosis and Prescription in Caritas in Veritate and Vocation of the Business Leader.Jim Wishloff - 2014 - Solidarity: The Journal for Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics 4 (1):Article 8.
    An examination of two recent documents of Catholic Social Doctrine, Caritas in Veritate and Vocation of the Business Leader, is undertaken to uncover their assessment of our current cultural and moral crisis, of which our present economic distress is but one aspect, and their proposal for cultural renewal including a return to sound economic decision making. The intellectual commitments of molders of the modern mind such as Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes severed morality at its metaphysical roots. Destroying the anthropological underpinnings (...)
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  24. Le Savoir en appel. Heidegger et le tournant dans la vérité.Franz-Emmanuel Schürch - 2009 - Zeta Books.
    Ce livre propose, à partir du constat de difficultés importantes et de paradoxes dans la conception heideggérienne de la vérité comme décèlement (aletheia), une nouvelle interprétation du fameux « tournant » qui sera compris comme la nécessité d’une structure d’inversion réciproque des rapports fondatifs. Contre tous les replis subjectifs ou les fixations sur des subsistances illusoires, cette structure « tournante » (à la racine du cercle herméneutique) montre comment aucune vérité ne s’établit sans sortie hors de soi, sans être provoquée (...)
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  25.  74
    Nos comportements inconscients automatisés révèlent-ils notre vrai moi et nos vérités cachées sur l’univers ? -- Un examen de David Hawkins « Puissance vs Force » (Power vs Force)--les déterminants cachés du comportement humain -édition officielle de l’auteur' 412p (2012)(édition originale 1995)(revue révisée 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Bienvenue en Enfer sur Terre : Bébés, Changement climatique, Bitcoin, Cartels, Chine, Démocratie, Diversité, Dysgénique, Égalité, Pirates informatiques, Droits de l'homme, Islam, Libéralisme, Prospérité, Le Web, Chaos, Famine, Maladie, Violence, Intellige. Las Vegas,NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 242-245.
    Je suis très habitué à des livres étranges et des gens spéciaux, mais Hawkins se distingue par son utilisation d’une technique simple pour tester la tension musculaire comme une clé de la «vérité» de tout type de déclaration que ce soit, c’est-à-dire pas seulement à savoir si la personne testée croit, mais si c’est vraiment vrai! Ce que l’on sait bien, c’est que les gens montreront des réponses physiologiques et psychologiques automatiques, inconscientes à peu près tout ce à quoi ils (...)
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  26. "Is Truth a Form Inherent in Things? Lawrence Dewan and De Veritate, Question 1, Article 4".Nelson Ramirez - 2020 - Nova et Vetera 18 (1):161-177.
    The purpose of this essay is to look at whether Aquinas teaches in De veritate [DV], q. 1, a. 4, that truth is a form inherent in things. I take up this investigation because I am examining Lawrence Dewan's account of Aquinas's teaching on truth.1 On Dewan's account, a significant development occurs in Aquinas's teaching as regards truth as it is found in things. Before the Summa theologiae [ST], Aquinas thought that in addition to truth being in the intellect, it (...)
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  27. La Prassi Ragionevole E Ragionata Della Verità. Sulla Struttura Del De Veritate di Anselmo D’Aosta.Gianluca De Candia - 2011 - Odegitria. Annali dell'Istituto Superiore di Scienze Religiose -Bari 18 (2011):9-18.
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  28. The Truth in Gnosticism.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.
    The paper discusses some challenges to veritism, the view that the fundamental epistemic good is knowledge. It looks like the best way to meet these challenges might be to appeal to some of Sosa's ideas about the value of achievements, but I argue that the performance normativity framework only gives us part of what we want. What we need is a more radical break with the veritist approach. We need to embrace gnosticism, the view that knowledge is the fundamental (...)
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  29.  59
    A Puzzle About Epistemic Value and Steps Towards a Solution.Timothy Perrine - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12103-12119.
    This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I conclude by indicating how the (...)
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  30. The Epistemic Value of Understanding-Why.Xingming Hu - forthcoming - Episteme:1-17.
    Some philosophers recently have objected that veritism cannot explain the epistemic value of understanding-why. And they have proposed two anti-veritist accounts. In this paper, I first introduce their objection and argue that it fails. Next, I consider a strengthened version of their objection and argue that it also fails. After that, I suggest a new veritist account: Understanding-why entails believing the truth that what is grasped is accurate, and it is this true belief, along with many other true beliefs (...)
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  31. Medvedkine.Gavin Keeney - 2013 - eVolo 5 (Architecture Xenoculture):247-49.
    Chris Marker’s portrait of Alexandre Medvedkine in the 1993 film Le tombeau d’Alexandre/The Last Bolshevik is highly instructive of his own relationship to Soviet cinema. Most especially, this difficult or troubled rapport with the antecedents to cinéma vérité in the West (and its protean formal properties, in terms of structure and often satirical-critical commentary) comes forth in the figures he assembles to comment upon Medvedkine’s life work. When Medvedkine’s Scast’e (Le Bonheur/Happiness) (1934) leaked to the West (c.1967), sent like an (...)
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  32. Why Do True Beliefs Differ in Epistemic Value?Xingming Hu - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):255-269.
    Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my (...)
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  33. What’s Epistemic About Epistemic Paternalism?Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York: Routledge. pp. 132–150.
    The aim of this paper is to (i) examine the concept of epistemic paternalism and (ii) explore the consequences of normative questions one might ask about it. I begin by critically examining several definitions of epistemic paternalism that have been proposed, and suggesting ways they might be improved. I then contrast epistemic and general paternalism and argue that it’s difficult to see what makes epistemic paternalism an epistemic phenomenon at all. Next, I turn to the various normative questions one might (...)
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  34.  96
    Natural Law and the Natural Environment: Pope Benedict XVI's Vision Beyond Utilitarianism and Deontology.Michael Baur - 2013 - In Tobias Winwright & Jame Schaefer (eds.), Environmental Justice and Climate Change: Assessing Pope Benedict XVI's Ecological Vision for the Catholic Church in the United States. Lanham, MD 20706, USA: pp. 43-57.
    In his 2009 encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate, Pope Benedict XVI calls for a deeper, theological and metaphysical evaluation of the category of “relation” to achieve a proper understanding of the human being’s “transcendent dignity.” For some contemporary thinkers, this position might seem to be hopelessly paradoxical or even incoherent. After all, many contemporary thinkers are apt to believe that the human creature can have “transcendent dignity” only if the being and goodness of the human creature is not conditioned by (...)
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  35. Truth and Epistemic Value.Nick Treanor - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1057-1068.
    The notion of more truth, or of more truth and less falsehood, is central to epistemology. Yet, I argue, we have no idea what this consists in, as the most natural or obvious thing to say—that more truth is a matter of a greater number of truths, and less falsehood is a matter of a lesser number of falsehoods—is ultimately implausible. The issue is important not merely because the notion of more truth and less falsehood is central to epistemology, but (...)
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  36. Against the Doctrine of Infallibility.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa082.
    According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse.
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  37.  64
    Neural phase: a new problem for the modal account of epistemic luck.Adam Michael Bricker - 2019 - Synthese (8):1-18.
    One of the most widely recognised intuitions about knowledge is that knowing precludes believing truly as a matter of luck. On Pritchard’s highly influential modal account of epistemic luck, luckily true beliefs are, roughly, those for which there are many close possible worlds in which the same belief formed in the same way is false. My aim is to introduce a new challenge to this account. Starting from the observation—as documented by a number of recent EEG studies—that our capacity to (...)
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  38. Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.
    This is a critical discussion of the accuracy-first approach to epistemic norms. If you think of accuracy (gradational or categorical) as the fundamental epistemic good and think of epistemic goods as things that call for promotion, you might think that we should use broadly consequentialist reasoning to determine which norms govern partial and full belief. After presenting consequentialist arguments for probabilism and the normative Lockean view, I shall argue that the consequentialist framework isn't nearly as promising as it might first (...)
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  39.  55
    Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Wes Siscoe - forthcoming - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    James Joyce’s article “A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism” introduced an approach to arguing for credal norms by appealing to the epistemic value of accuracy. The central thought was that credences ought to accurately represent the world, a guiding thought that has gone on to generate an entire research paradigm on the rationality of credences. Recently, a number of epistemologists have begun to apply this same thought to full beliefs, attempting to explain and argue for norms of belief in terms of (...)
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  40. Dispositional Evaluations and Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - In Jessica and Simion Brown (ed.), Reasons, Justification and Defeat. Oxford, UK:
    Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticisable. Many think that this is because such higher-order evidence defeats various epistemic statuses such as justification and knowledge, but it is notoriously difficult to give an account of such defeat. This paper outlines an alternative explanation, stemming from some of my earlier work, for why subjects are criticisable for retaining beliefs in the face (...)
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  41. The Philosophical Controversy Over Political Forgiveness.Alice MacLachlan - 2012 - In Paul van Tongeren, Neelke Doorn & Bas van Stokkom (eds.), Public Forgiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts. Intersentia. pp. 37-64.
    The question of forgiveness in politics has attained a certain cachet. Indeed, in the fifty years since Arendt commented on the notable absence of forgiveness in the political tradition, a vast and multidisciplinary literature on the politics of apology, reparation, and reconciliation has emerged. To a novice scouring the relevant literatures, it might appear that the only discordant note in this new veritable symphony of writings on political forgiveness has been sounded by philosophers. There is a more-than-healthy cynicism directed at (...)
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  42. Accuracy and Epistemic Conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis:any094.
    Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with \emph{veritism}. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: Norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true (...)
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  43. Defeaters as Indicators of Ignorance.Clayton Litlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, we propose a new theory of rationality defeat. We propose that defeaters are indicators of ignorance, evidence that we’re not in a position to know some target proposition. When the evidence that we’re not in a position to know is sufficiently strong and the probability that we can know is too low, it is not rational to believe. We think that this account retains all the virtues of the more familiar approaches that characterise defeat in terms of (...)
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  44.  26
    Accuracy, Probabilism, and the Insufficiency of the Alethic.Corey Dethier - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-17.
    The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent's degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant (...)
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  45. Knowledge as a Thick Concept: Explaining Why the Gettier Problem Arises.Brent G. Kyle - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27.
    The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and (...)
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  46. Quine and His Critics on Truth-Functionality and Extensionality.Charles Sayward - 2007 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 16 (1):45-63.
    Quine argues that if sentences that are set theoretically equivalent are interchangeable salva veritate, then all transparent operators are truth-functional. Criticisms of this argument fail to take into account the conditional character of the conclusion. Quine also argues that, for any person P with minimal logical acuity, if ‘belief’ has a sense in which it is a transparent operator, then, in that sense of the word, P believes everything if P believes anything. The suggestion is made that he intends that (...)
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  47. Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous example (...)
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  48.  63
    Lecture du Commentaire de Thomas d'Aquin Sur le Traité de la Démonstration D'Aristote: Savoir, C'est Connaître la Cause.Guy-François Delaporte - 2005 - L'harmattan.
    C’est un véritable Discours de la Méthode qu’Aristote nous livre avec son traité de la démonstration intitulé Seconds Analytiques. Avec lui, l’auteur parvient au sommet de l’art logique dont il est le véritable inventeur.
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  49. Epistemic Luck.Mylan Engel Jr - 2011 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-41.
    Epistemic luck is a generic notion used to describe any of a number of ways in which it can be accidental, coincidental, or fortuitous that a person has a true belief. For example, one can form a true belief as a result of a lucky guess, as when one believes through guesswork that “C” is the right answer to a multiple-choice question and one’s belief just happens to be correct. One can form a true belief via wishful thinking; for example, (...)
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  50. The Right in the Good: A Defense of Teleological Non-Consequentialism in Epistemology.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij Jeff Dunn (ed.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press.
    There has been considerable discussion recently of consequentialist justifications of epistemic norms. In this paper, I shall argue that these justifications are not justifications. The consequentialist needs a value theory, a theory of the epistemic good. The standard theory treats accuracy as the fundamental epistemic good and assumes that it is a good that calls for promotion. Both claims are mistaken. The fundamental epistemic good involves accuracy, but it involves more than just that. The fundamental epistemic good is knowledge, not (...)
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