Ontic vagueness and metaphysical indeterminacy

Philosophy Compass 3 (4):763-788 (2008)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Might it be that world itself, independently of what we know about it or how we represent it, is metaphysically indeterminate? This article tackles in turn a series of questions: In what sorts of cases might we posit metaphysical indeterminacy? What is it for a given case of indefiniteness to be 'metaphysical'? How does the phenomenon relate to 'ontic vagueness', the existence of 'vague objects', 'de re indeterminacy' and the like? How might the logic work? Are there reasons for postulating this distinctive sort of indefiniteness? Conversely, are there reasons for denying that there is indefiniteness of this sort?
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
WILOVA
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-11-02
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
486 ( #9,051 of 52,707 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #18,837 of 52,707 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.