P, but you don’t know that P

Synthese 199 (5-6):14667-14690 (2021)
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Abstract
Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “p, but you don’t know that p.” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about the norm of assertion that what licenses proper assertion is not the initiating epistemic position of the speaker but the resulting epistemic position of the audience.
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First archival date: 2021-10-07
Latest version: 2 (2021-10-26)
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2021-10-07

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