If This Is My Body … : A Defence of the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):315-341 (2013)
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I defend the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing: the claim that doing harm is harder to justify than merely allowing harm. A thing does not genuinely belong to a person unless he has special authority over it. The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing protects us against harmful imposition – against the actions or needs of another intruding on what is ours. This protection is necessary for something to genuinely belong to a person. The opponent of the Doctrine must claim that nothing genuinely belongs to a person, even his own body

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Fiona Woollard
University of Southampton


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