Logical Partisanhood

Philosophical Studies:1-22 (forthcoming)
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A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of any scientific theory (Hjortland, Priest, Russell, Williamson, etc.) I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more recent and popular heterodox logics such as naive logics of truth. I use this discussion to motivate a constraint—LOGICAL PARTISANHOOD—on the uses of such methodology: roughly: both the proposed alternative and our actual background logic must be able to agree that moving to the alternative logic is no worse than staying put.
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First archival date: 2018-01-17
Latest version: 2 (2018-02-23)
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Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Cobreros, Pablo; Egré, Paul; Ripley, David & van Rooij, Robert
Axiomatizing Kripke's Theory of Truth.Halbach, Volker & Horsten, Leon
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Goodman, Nelson & Van Melsen, Andrew G.

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