Logic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works

Philosophers and logicians talk of arguments for conclusions. In a recent paper, Jeffrey Goodman identifies a common way of thinking about what an argument is. I propose a definition that is quite different to this common way. I also make two objections to Goodman’s proposed definition.

In this paper, I argue against present accounts of anti-exceptionalism about logic, while preserving some of their insights. I will do that by offering objections against the anti-exceptionalists’ claims that revisions happen in the same way in sciences and in logic, and that the methodology of logic involves abduction simpliciter. I propose a new account of theory divergence for logic with anti-exceptionalist aspects which also preserves exceptionalism on some level while considering the role of metalogic in the exceptionalist/anti-exceptionalist debate.

In the 17th century, Hobbes stated that we reason by addition and subtraction. Historians of logic note that Hobbes thought of reasoning as “a ‘species of computation’” but point out that “his writing contains in fact no attempt to work out such a project.” Though Leibniz mentions the plus/minus character of the positive and negative copulas, neither he nor Hobbes say anything about a plus/minus character of other common logical words that drive our deductive judgments, words like ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘if’, (...) and ‘and’, each of which actually turns out to have an oppositive, character that allows us, “in our silent reasoning,” to ignore its literal meaning and to reckon with it as one reckons with a plus or a minus operator in elementary algebra or arithmetic. These ‘logical constants’ of natural language figure crucially in our everyday reasoning. Because Hobbes and Leibniz did not identify them as the plus and minus words we reason with, their insight into what goes on in ‘ratiocination’ did not provide a guide for a research program that could develop a +/- logic that actually describes how we reason deductively. I will argue that such a +/- logic provides a way back from modern predicate logic—the logic of quantifiers and bound variables that is now ‘standard logic’—to an Aristotelian term logic of natural language that had been the millennial standard logic. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a dialectical argument for a priori skepticism (i.e. the thesis that we can be skeptical about a priori knowledge). Then, we propose a framework that combines elements from inferential contextualism and logical conventionalism to offer a weak transcendental argument against a priori skepticism.

Is identity fundamental to every conceptual systems? In this article I intend to present reasons against the claim that every conceptual system presupposes the notion of identity. To address this debate I analyze the positions of Bueno (2014; 2016) and Krause and Arenhart (2015). While Bueno argues that identity is necessary for all conceptual systems, Krause and Arenhart present a series of objections against such position, thus defending that identity is not fundamental. I intend to show that the main objections (...) presented by Krause and Arenhart do not affect Bueno’s theory because of a misinterpretation of his arguments. Finally, I will present some objections against Bueno that, hopefully, does not miss the target. (shrink)

This chapter introduces and discusses the concepts of necessary and sufficient conditions.

The pragmatic notion of assertion has an important inferential role in logic. There are also many notational forms to express assertions in logical systems. This paper reviews, compares and analyses languages with signs for assertions, including explicit signs such as Frege’s and Dalla Pozza’s logical systems and implicit signs with no specific sign for assertion, such as Peirce’s algebraic and graphical logics and the recent modification of the latter termed Assertive Graphs. We identify and discuss the main ‘points’ of these (...) notations on the logical representation of assertions, and evaluate their systems from the perspective of the philosophy of logical notations. Pragmatic assertions turn out to be useful in providing intended interpretations of a variety of logical systems. (shrink)

Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every (...) one of the scientific systems whose construction is the ultimate aim of science, and in which all truths have a place. Though an account of logic in terms of scientific systems might seem hopelessly antiquated, I argue that it is not: a basically Fregean account of the nature of logic still looks quite promising. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. A comparison to Mach’s doctrine is used to be revealed the fundamental and philosophical reductionism of Husserl’s phenomenology leading to a kind of Pythagoreanism in the final (...) analysis. (shrink)

在《哥德尔之路》中,三位杰出的科学家讨论了不可解性、不完整性、随机性、可估计性和副一致性等问题。我从维特根斯坦的观点出发来处理这些问题,即有两个基本问题有着完全不同的解决方案。有科学或经验问题,这是关 于世界的事实,需要研究观察和哲学问题,如何使用语言可理解(其中包括数学和逻辑中的某些问题),需要通过查看我们在特定上下文中实际使用单词的方式来决定。当我们清楚要玩哪种语言游戏时,这些话题就像其他话题一 样被视为普通的科学和数学问题。维特根斯坦的见解很少被平等,也从未被超越,今天和80年前他口述《蓝书》和《棕色书》时一样具有现实意义。尽管它的失败——实际上是一系列笔记,而不是一本已完成的书——这是这三 位著名学者作品的独特来源,他们半个多世纪以来一直在物理学、数学和哲学的流血边缘工作。达科斯塔和多里亚被沃尔珀特引用(见下文或我的文章沃尔珀特和我对亚诺夫斯基的"理性的外在极限"的评 论),因为他们写了通用计算,在他的许多成就中,达科斯塔是先驱参数一致性。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Mind 和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-201 9年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .

This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...) we propose our \ logic. Finally, we show how \ supports the dialetheic solution of the liar paradox. (shrink)

We introduce a family of operators to combine Description Logic concepts. They aim to characterise complex concepts that apply to instances that satisfy \enough" of the concept descriptions given. For instance, an individual might not have any tusks, but still be considered an elephant. To formalise the meaning of "enough", the operators take a list of weighted concepts as arguments, and a certain threshold to be met. We commence a study of the formal properties of these operators, and study some (...) variations. The intended applications concern the representation of cognitive aspects of classi cation tasks: the interdependencies among the attributes that de ne a concept, the prototype of a concept, and the typicality of the instances. (shrink)

ويعتقد عادة أن الاستحالة، وعدم اكتمال، وParaconsistency، وعدم تحديد، العشوائية، والحوسبة، والمفارقة، وعدم اليقين وحدود العقل هي قضايا علمية مادية أو رياضية متباينة وجود القليل أو لا شيء في المشتركه. أقترح أنها مشاكل فلسفية قياسية إلى حد كبير (أي ألعاب اللغة) التي تم حلها في الغالب من قبل فيتغنشتاين أكثر من 80years منذ. -/- "إن ما نميل إلى قوله في مثل هذه الحالة هو، بطبيعة الحال، ليس فلسفة، ولكنه مادة خام. وهكذا، على سبيل المثال، ما يميل عالم الرياضيات إلى قوله (...) عن موضوعية وواقع الحقائق الرياضية، ليس فلسفة الرياضيات، بل شيء للعلاج الفلسفي". فيتغنشتاين بي 234 -/- "يرى الفلاسفة باستمرار طريقة العلم أمام أعينهم ويميلون بشكل لا يقاوم إلى طرح الأسئلة والإجابة عليها بالطريقة التي يفعلبها العلم. هذا الاتجاه هو المصدر الحقيقي للميتافيزيقيا ويقود الفيلسوف إلى الظلام الكامل". فيتغنشتاين -/- أقدم ملخصاً موجزاً لبعض النتائج الرئيسية لاثنين من أبرز الطلاب في السلوك في العصر الحديث، لودفيغ فيتغنشتاين وجون سيرل، على البنية المنطقية للتعمد (العقل واللغة والسلوك)، مع الأخذ كنقطة انطلاق لي اكتشاف فيتغنشتاين الأساسي - أن جميع المشاكل "الفلسفية" حقاهي نفسها - الالتباسات حول كيفية استخدام اللغة في سياق معين، وبالتالي فإن جميع الحلول هي نفسها - النظر في كيفية استخدام اللغة في السياق في القضية بحيث حقيقتها الشروط (شروط الرضا أو COS) واضحة. المشكلة الأساسية هي أن المرء يمكن أن يقول أي شيء، ولكن لا يمكن للمرء أن يعني (الدولة واضحة كوس ل) أي كلام ومعنى تعسفي غير ممكن إلا في سياق محدد جدا. -/- أنا تشريح بعض كتابات عدد قليل من المعلقين الرئيسيين على هذه القضايا من وجهة نظر Wittgensteinian في إطار المنظور الحديث للنظاميين الفكر (شعبية باسم 'التفكير السريع، والتفكير بطيئة')، وتوظيف جدول جديد من التعمد وتسميات النظم المزدوجة الجديدة. أنا تبين أن هذا هو سياحي قوي لوصف الطبيعة الحقيقية لهذه القضايا العلمية أو المادية أو الرياضية المفترضة التي يتم التعامل معها على أفضل وجه حقا كمشاكل فلسفية قياسية لكيفية استخدام اللغة (ألعاب اللغة في فيتغنشتاين المصطلحات). -/- هو زعمي أن جدول التعمد (العقلانية، العقل، الفكر، اللغة، الشخصية وما إلى ذلك) التي تبرز بشكل بارز هنا يصف أكثر أو أقل دقة، أو على الأقل بمثابة سياحية ل، وكيف نفكر وتصرف، وبالتالي فإنه لا يشمل مجرد فلسفة وعلم نفس، ولكن كل شيء آخر (التاريخ والأدب والرياضيات والسياسة الخ). لاحظ بشكل خاص أن التعمد والعقلانية كما أنا (جنبا إلى جنب مع سيرل، فيتغنشتاين وغيرها) عرض ذلك، ويشمل كل من النظام اللغوي التداولي الواعي 2 واللاوعي الآلي النظام قبل اللغوية 1 الإجراءات أو ردود الفعل. (shrink)

The first group of articles attempt to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of theoretical delusions. In the next three groups I comment on three of the principal delusions preventing a sustainable world— technology, religion and politics (cooperative groups). People believe that society can be saved by them, so I provide some suggestions in the rest of the book as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. (...) -/- America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a nightmare of crime and poverty. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. Hence my essay “Suicide by Democracy”. It is also now clear that the seven sociopaths who rule China are winning world war 3, and so my concluding essay on them. The only greater threat is Artificial Intelligence which I comment on briefly in the last paragraph. (shrink)

I distinguish two ways of developing anti-exceptionalist approaches to logical revision. The first emphasizes comparing the theoretical virtuousness of developed bodies of logical theories, such as classical and intuitionistic logic. I'll call this whole theory comparison. The second attempts local repairs to problematic bits of our logical theories, such as dropping excluded middle to deal with intuitions about vagueness. I'll call this the piecemeal approach. I then briefly discuss a problem I've developed elsewhere for comparisons of logical theories. Essentially, the (...) problem is that a pair of logics may each evaluate the alternative as superior to themselves, resulting in oscillation between logical options. The piecemeal approach offers a way out of this problem andthereby might seem a preferable to whole theory comparisons. I go on to show that reflective equilibrium, the best known piecemeal method, has deep problems of its own when applied to logic. (shrink)

A natural suggestion and increasingly popular account of how to revise our logical beliefs treats revision of logic analogously to the revision of scientific theories. I investigate this approach and argue that simple applications of abductive methodology to logic result in revision-cycles, developing a detailed case study of an actual dispute with this property. This is problematic if we take abductive methodology to provide justification for revising our logical framework. I then generalize the case study, pointing to similarities with more (...) recent and popular heterodox logics such as naïve logics of truth. I use this discussion to motivate a constraint—logical partisanhood—on the uses of such methodology: roughly: both the proposed alternative and our actual background logic must be able to agree that moving to the alternative logic is no worse than staying put. (shrink)

There is an exegetical quandary when it comes to interpreting Locke's relation to logic.On the one hand, over the last few decades a substantive amount of literature has been dedicated to explaining Locke's crucial role in the development of a new logic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. John Yolton names this new logic the "logic of ideas," while James Buickerood calls it "facultative logic."1 Either way, Locke's Essay is supposedly its "most outspoken specimen" or "culmination."2 Call this reading the (...) 'New Logic interpretation.'On the other hand, from the typical standpoint of a philosopher accustomed to the modern conception of logic, whatever Locke—indeed, whatever most of the... (shrink)

I investigate syntactic notions of theoretical equivalence between logical theories and a recent objection thereto. I show that this recent criticism of syntactic accounts, as extensionally inadequate, is unwarranted by developing an account which is plausibly extensionally adequate and more philosophically motivated. This is important for recent anti-exceptionalist treatments of logic since syntactic accounts require less theoretical baggage than semantic accounts.

The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, which in turn are taken to hold objectively. However, we might question our faith in these truths: why are they true? One general approach, proposed by Putnam [8] and more recently Dickson [3] or Maddy [5], is to adopt empiricism about logic. On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – this gives logical truths an air of objectivity. Putnam and Dickson both (...) take logical truths to be true in virtue of the world’s structure, given by our best empirical theory, quantum mechanics. This assumes a determinate logical structure of the world given by quantum mechanics. Here, I argue that this assumption is false, and that the world’s logical structure, and hence the related ‘true’ logic, is underdetermined. This leads to what I call empirical conventionalism. (shrink)

Working within the broad lines of general consensus that mark out the core features of John Stuart Mill’s (1806–1873) logic, as set forth in his A System of Logic (1843–1872), this chapter provides an introduction to Mill’s logical theory by reviewing his position on the relationship between induction and deduction, and the role of general premises and principles in reasoning. Locating induction, understood as a kind of analogical reasoning from particulars to particulars, as the basic form of inference that is (...) both free-standing and the sole load-bearing structure in Mill’s logic, the foundations of Mill’s logical system are briefly inspected. Several naturalistic features are identified, including its subject matter, human reasoning, its empiricism, which requires that only particular, experiential claims can function as basic reasons, and its ultimate foundations in ‘spontaneous’ inference. The chapter concludes by comparing Mill’s naturalized logic to Russell’s (1907) regressive method for identifying the premises of mathematics. (shrink)

John Venn has the “uneasy suspicion” that the stagnation in mathematical logic between J. H. Lambert and George Boole was due to Kant’s “disastrous effect on logical method,” namely the “strictest preservation [of logic] from mathematical encroachment.” Kant’s actual position is more nuanced, however. In this chapter, I tease out the nuances by examining his use of Leonhard Euler’s circles and comparing it with Euler’s own use. I do so in light of the developments in logical calculus from G. W. (...) Leibniz to Lambert and Gottfried Ploucquet. While Kant is evidently open to using mathematical tools in logic, his main concern is to clarify what mathematical tools can be used to achieve. For without such clarification, all efforts at introducing mathematical tools into logic would be blind if not complete waste of time. In the end, Kant would stress, the means provided by formal logic at best help us to express and order what we already know in some sense. No matter how much mathematical notations may enhance the precision of this function of formal logic, it does not change the fact that no truths can, strictly speaking, be revealed or established by means of those notations. (shrink)

In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at (...) how we actually use words in particular contexts. When we get clear about which language game we are playing, these topics are seen to be ordinary scientific and mathematical questions like any others. Wittgenstein’s insights have seldom been equaled and never surpassed and are as pertinent today as they were 80 years ago when he dictated the Blue and Brown Books. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

“Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the Fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The False. This dissertation treats of the slingshot dubbed “Gödel’s slingshot”. Gödel argued that there (...) is a deep connection between these arguments and definite descriptions. More precisely, according to Gödel, if one adopts Russell’s interpretation of definite descriptions (which clashes with Frege’s view that definite descriptions are singular terms), it is possible to evade the slingshot. We challenge Gödel’s view in two manners, first by presenting a slingshot even with a Russellian interpretation of definite descriptions and second by presenting a slingshot even when we change from singular terms to plural terms in the light of new developments of the so-called Plural Logic. The text is divided in three chapters, in the first, we present the discussion between Russell and Frege regarding definite descriptions, in the second, we present Gödel’s position and reconstructions of Gödel’s argument and in the third we prove our slingshot argument for Plural Logic. In light of these results we conclude that we can maintain the validity of slingshot arguments even within a Russellian interpretation of definite descriptions or in the context of Plural Logic. (shrink)

Identity is traditionally taken to be a fundamental notion of our conceptual framework as well as a fundamental metaphysical component of entities. But as far as we make this claim we face ourselves with two problems: what is identity? And why would it be fundamental? These questions will guide us towards a discussion put forward by Bueno (2014), Krause and Arenhart (2015). Bueno holds that there are four aspects that make identity being fundamental: (1) identity is assumed in every conceptual (...) system; (2) it is required for a minimal characterisation of being an individual; (3) it cannot be defined; and (4) identity is required for quantification. On the other hand, Krause and Arenhart refuse the thesis that identity is fundamental replying to Bueno's arguments. In this dissertation we will deal with this debate. In the introduction we will deal with the first problem what is identity? , showing how this concept is traditionally understood, either for its metaphysical characteristics as for its formal account. After that we will deal with each of the four aspects defended by Bueno and challenged by Krause and Arenhart. After a critical presentation of each position we will also provide other arguments for the current debate. Finally we will outline an alternative view to those defended throughout this work. -/- . (shrink)

Is identity fundamental to formal systems? Even if a system have no the identity relation, is that concept is not assumed in any way – whether in a metalinguistic or intuitive level? In this paper we shall discuss this issue. Otávio Bueno (2014, 2016) argues against the elimination of identity, holding that this concept is fundamental and non-eliminable (even in does systems that claim to do so). Décio Arenhart Krause and Jonas (2015), by the other hand, have a number of (...) objections to Bueno’s thesis. Firstly, we look at how the concept of identity was accounted in the philosophical tradition, as well as part of its formal account. We will also examine the notion of indiscernibility that, according to the traditional approach to identity, is equivalent to the notion of identity, but (arguably) is not it logically equivalent. Thus, we shall state Krause and Arenhart’s strategy, according to, in a formal system we can eliminate identity in favor of the indiscernibility notion. Finally, we shall expose Bueno’s criticism to such strategy, and then to put forward some objections against it. (shrink)

Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anumāna (often translated as inference) as developed by Dignāga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakīti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and, thus, logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. According to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however, logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be formal, (...) it is difficult to see what bearing logic has on knowledge. In this paper, by weaving together the main threads of thought that are salient in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīti’s texts, I shall re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of epistemology and demarcate the logical part of epistemology which can be recognised as logic. I shall demonstrate that we can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by Buddhist logicians despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the context of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper explores the question of what logic is not. It argues against the wide spread assumptions that logic is: a model of reason; a model of correct reason; the laws of thought, or indeed is related to reason at all such that the essential nature of the two are crucially or essentially co-illustrative. I note that due to such assumptions, our current understanding of the nature of logic itself is thoroughly entangled with the nature of reason. I show that (...) most arguments for the presence of any sort of essential re- lationship between logic and reason face intractable problems and demands, and fall well short of addressing them. These arguments include those for the notion that logic is normative for reason (or that logic and correct reason are in some way the same thing), that logic is some sort of description of correct reason and that logic is an abstracted or idealised version of correct reason. A strong version of logical realism is put forward as an alternative view, and is briefly explored. (shrink)

The paper analyses the role played by the concept of ‘common ground’ in argumentation theories. If a common agreement on all the rules of a discursive exchange is required, either at the beginning or at the end of an argumentative practice, then no violation of the rules is possible. The paper suggests an alternative understanding of ‘common ground’ as something that can change during the development of the argumentative practice, and in particular something that can change without the practice being (...) stopped, just as one sometimes violates the rule of a game without stopping playing. The analysis of some historical examples shows that the violation of rules sometimes leads to a consensual change of a set of beliefs and values. The argumentative rationality thus needs to be reconsidered in the light of the analysis of the conditions under which it would be legitimate to change the rules of an argumentative practice: ‘common ground’ and the right to disagreement, even radical or violent, could then be defended as essential components of argumentative rationality. (shrink)

Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...) como questões acerca das conexões destes com a realidade não mental e extralinguística. A razão daquela qualificação é a seguinte: por um lado, a investigação em questão é qualificada como filosófica em virtude do elevado grau de generalidade e abstracção das questões examinadas (entre outras coisas); por outro, a investigação é qualificada como lógica em virtude de ser uma investigação logicamente disciplinada, no sentido de nela se fazer um uso intenso de conceitos, técnicas e métodos provenientes da disciplina de lógica. O agregado de tópicos que constitui a área de estudos lógico-filosóficos é já visível, pelo menos em parte, no Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus de Ludwig Wittgenstein, uma obra publicada em 1921. E uma boa maneira de ter uma ideia sinóptica do território disciplinar abrangido por esta enciclopédia, ou pelo menos de uma porção substancial dele, é extrair do Tractatus uma lista dos tópicos mais salientes aí discutidos; a lista incluirá certamente tópicos do seguinte género, muitos dos quais se podem encontrar ao longo desta enciclopédia: factos e estados de coisas; objectos; representação; crenças e estados mentais; pensamentos; a proposição; nomes próprios; valores de verdade e bivalência; quantificação; funções de verdade; verdade lógica; identidade; tautologia; o raciocínio matemático; a natureza da inferência; o cepticismo e o solipsismo; a indução; as constantes lógicas; a negação; a forma lógica; as leis da ciência; o número. (shrink)

It is outlined the possibility to extend the quantum formalism in relation to the requirements of the general systems theory. It can be done by using a quantum semantics arising from the deep logical structure of quantum theory. It is so possible taking into account the logical openness relationship between observer and system. We are going to show how considering the truth-values of quantum propositions within the context of the fuzzy sets is here more useful for systemics. In conclusion we (...) propose an example of formal quantum coherence. (shrink)

Vi è prepotente orient-amento nella civiltà orientale contemporanea, un imperioso richiamo ad orient-arsi verso l’est, appunto. Daremo degli esempi di questo moto epocale, che appare sostanzialmente un moto dell’Anima, nel senso Hillman. Ma cos’è l’Oriente? Forse l’Oriente: “Non è una realtà naturale, ma un idea, e più precisamente un’idea occidentale, con una storia e una patologia di miti e di significati nascosti” (Clarke 1996).

“Anima naturaliter christiana” (Anima naturalmente cristiana) così si esprimeva per Tertulliano, e per Jung questo vale in senso psicologico, per noi occidentali: “Per lui (l’occidentale) l’uomo interiormente è infimo… cerca di propiziarsi quella grande potenza (Dio), mediante il timore, la penitenza, le promesse, la sottomissione, l’autoumiliazione… la grande potenza non è egli stesso, bensì… l’interamente altro, assolutamente perfetto ed esterno, l’unica realtà… (per l’orientale) La psiche è perciò la cosa più importante, è il respiro che tutto penetra… Tutta la vita (...) fluisce da lui e tutte le diverse forme apparenti si ridissolvono in lui… Anziché mandare a mente le tecniche spirituali dell’Oriente, sarebbe molto più importante scoprire se esiste nell’inconscio una tendenza introversa, simile al principio spirituale che domina in Oriente… Saremmo allora in condizione di edificare sul nostro suolo e con i nostri metodi. (shrink)

Argumentations are at the heart of the deductive and the hypothetico-deductive methods, which are involved in attempts to reduce currently open problems to problems already solved. These two methods span the entire spectrum of problem-oriented reasoning from the simplest and most practical to the most complex and most theoretical, thereby uniting all objective thought whether ancient or contemporary, whether humanistic or scientific, whether normative or descriptive, whether concrete or abstract. Analysis, synthesis, evaluation, and function of argumentations are described. Perennial philosophic (...) problems, epistemic and ontic, related to argumentations are put in perspective. So much of what has been regarded as logic is seen to be involved in the study of argumentations that logic may be usefully defined as the systematic study of argumentations, which is virtually identical to the quest of objective understanding of objectivity. (shrink)

After a short preface, the first of the three sections of this paper is devoted to historical and philosophic aspects of categoricity. The second section is a self-contained exposition, including detailed definitions, of a proof that every mathematical system whose domain is the closure of its set of distinguished individuals under its distinguished functions is categorically characterized by its induction principle together with its true atoms (atomic sentences and negations of atomic sentences). The third section deals with applications especially those (...) involving the distinction between characterizing a system and axiomatizing the truths of a system. (shrink)

Dialectic, as commonly approached, is not an analytic study, as the notion is defined in the paper. Where it is analytically approached (as, for example, by Grice and Hamblin), the result is pragmatic in nature, as well as syntactic and semantic. This paper lays the foundations of a purely formal (nonpragmatic) analysis of conversations. This study is accordingly called "Conversation Theory". The key notions of "conversation", "dialogue", "conversation game", "rules of response", "epistemic community" and "channel of informations" are defined precisely, (...) and an analysis of how these notions fit together is given. Particular attention is given to distinguishing conversation theory from standard logic. The paper concludes by analysing a few sample conversation-games, indicating areas needing further research, by pointing out the simplification inherent in the sample games. (shrink)

Intensions feature prominently among the entities we talk about.

This is the PhD dissertation, written under supervision of Professor Jerzy Słupecki, published in the book: U.Wybraniec-Skardowska i Grzegorz Bryll "Z badań nad teorią zdań odrzuconych" ( "Studies of theory of rejected sentences"), Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Opolu, Seria B: Studia i Monografie nr 22, pp. 5-131. It is the first, original publication on the theory of rejected sentences on which are based, among other, papers: "Theory of rejected propositions. I"and "Theory of rejected propositions II" with Jerzy Słupecki (...) and Grzegorz Bryll. -/- -/- . (shrink)

This document presents a Gentzen-style deductive calculus and proves that it is complete with respect to a 3-valued semantics for a language with quantifiers. The semantics resembles the strong Kleene semantics with respect to conjunction, disjunction and negation. The completeness proof for the sentential fragment fills in the details of a proof sketched in Arnon Avron (2003). The extension to quantifiers is original but uses standard techniques.

The shape of the egg is proposed to be the consequence of synergistic actions from the transmission of forces derived from instinctual motions and energy matter conversions that act to obstruct the grounding and neutralization of energy emissions by limiting in size the physical domain of self witness. A philosophy and theory associating, atemporal in nature, form and emergence is evolved from logical considerations for the construction of a mathematical/geometrical model of the egg that is generated from a template construed (...) from simple geometrical considerations. The acquisition of instinct as the setting/identity associated propagation of motion to avoid closed space is discussed in relation to cause and effect, the universal attribute of contingency and a special verses general case to describe the world. Analogy is made between the proposed natural transmission of the transparent/conceptual egg form, expressed physically at important nodes in the course of biological propagation to the philosophy of self- belonging of Bertrand Russell. (shrink)